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LAURA LODDO 
Voluntary Exile and Eisangelia in Athens: Remarks about 
the Lawfulness of a Widespread Practice1 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims to investigate the question of the (un)lawfulness of voluntary exile by 
defendants in relation to eisangelia trials. I argue that the defendant’s habit of evading 
trial by going into exile was never seen as lawful, despite the frequency with which it 
occurred. First, I examine the issue of alternating between the death penalty and exile 
in eisangelia trials with the aim of showing that exile was not a penalty linked to the 
procedure of impeachment. Then, I argue that Athenian law took into consideration 
the issue of the (un)lawfulness of self-exile, as demonstrated by the existence of an 
Athenian law concerning the same matter in homicide cases. Lastly, I analyse some 
ancient passages that allow us to state that defendants in high treason trials who 
evaded justice were likened to outlaws. Elements such as the practice of setting 
bounties on those who escaped trial, extradition requests for fugitives, the imposition 
of additional penalties such as confiscation of property and inscribing the fugitive’s 
name on a bronze stele, can corroborate this assumption. 
 
Questo articolo si propone di indagare la questione della (il)legittimità dell'esilio 
volontario da parte degli imputati nei processi per eisangelia. Si sostiene che 
l'abitudine dell'imputato di sottrarsi al processo con l’esilio non fu mai considerata 
legittima, nonostante la frequenza con cui si fece ricorso a tale condotta. In primo 
luogo, si esamina la questione dell'alternanza tra la pena di morte e l'esilio nei 
processi per alto tradimento, con l'obiettivo di dimostrare che l'esilio non fu una pena 
legata alla procedura di eisangelia. In secondo luogo, si sostiene che il diritto attico 
prese in considerazione la questione della (il)legittimità dell'auto-esilio, come 
dimostra l'esistenza di una legge ateniese che regolava la stessa materia nei casi di 
omicidio. Infine, si analizzano alcune testimonianze che permettono di affermare che 
gli imputati in processi per alto tradimento che si sottraevano alla giustizia furono 
assimilati a dei fuorilegge. Elementi come la pratica di fissare delle taglie su chi si 
sottraeva al processo, le richieste di estradizione per i fuggitivi, l'imposizione di 
ulteriori sanzioni come la confisca dei beni e l'iscrizione del nome del fuggitivo su 





1  Earlier versions of this paper were read in 2017 in Aix-en-Provence and in 2018 at the 
‘Giustizia e politica nell’Atene classica’ workshop, organized by Lorenzo Tanzini at the 
Università di Cagliari. I thank Cinzia Bearzot, Mirko Canevaro and Alberto Maffi for their 
helpful remarks and Maria Youni for allowing me to read her paper on atimia and outlawry 
before publication. Thanks are also due to the anonymous referees for their useful criticism. 
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1.  
A significant part of the eisangelia trials in classical Athens ended with the 
defendant not appearing at the trial. Hypereides explains in detail why this happened2. 
Prosecution by eisangelia was perceived as dangerous for defendants, who often 
chose to leave the country before the trial in the belief that it would be difficult for 
them to avoid being convicted. But how did the polis behave when a defendant failed 
to appear? Hansen suggested that in such cases the court would first issue a death 
sentence in absentia, then it automatically commuted it into exile. Failure to appear, 
therefore, was perceived as an admission of guilt and accordingly was punished with 
the maximum penalty. The commutation of the death penalty into exile obviously 
took account of the practical situation that had arisen through the voluntary departure 
of the accused from the country. But is there actually any trace of this commutation in 
the sources? And, above all, could this conduct on the part of the accused be 
considered lawful, as some have assumed? 
In this paper I analyse the question of the (un)lawfulness of voluntary exile by 
defendants in relation to eisangelia trials and argue that the habit of evading trial by 
going into exile was never seen as lawful, despite the frequency with which it 
occurred. While some scholars have assumed that voluntary exile was an option 
available to those who risked capital punishment, Hansen has suggested that when a 
defendant evaded trial, thus incurring the death penalty by default, the penalty was 
commutated to permanent exile3. I argue instead that such commutation does not 
make any sense. An in absentia defendant was considered guilty, sentenced to death 
by default, his property was confiscated, and his name was inscribed on the stele of 
the infamous. This means that he was considered an outlaw and for this reason he 
could have been prosecuted even in exile. Already MacDowell, although he has not 
developed the point, has noted that such a condemnation must have been similar in 
effect to exile, but that there are some differences between these two situations4. 
However, his remarks have not found support. 
 
2  Hyp. 4.3. 
3  TODD 1993, 139-140; KUCHARSKI 2014 and 2015, 19; HANSEN 1975, 35-36. 
4  MACDOWELL 1978, 255: ‘Condemnation of an absent man to death or outlawry must have 
been similar in effect to exile, since a man who suffered any of these was liable to be put do 
death if he showed himself in Attika. But one difference was that, as long as he remained 
outside Attika, an exile retained some protection under Athenian law, whereas an outlaw did 
not; thus anyone who killed or harassed an Athenian exile outside Attika and then came into 
Attika himself could be prosecuted for that offence’. 
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The issue of (un)lawfulness of self-exile is connected with the range of 
sanctions that could be imposed in the eisangelia procedure and has implications in 
our understanding of the sentencing procedures for eisangelia and its nature as an 
agōn timētos. In other words, we must assess whether exile could be one of the 
penalties in the eisangelia procedure. So, in the second section of this paper I examine 
the issue of alternating between the death penalty and exile in those trials, which were 
prosecuted by eisangelia, with the aim of showing that exile was not a penalty linked 
to the procedure of impeachment. This is possible through both a new interpretation 
of a passage in Aeschines’ Against Ctesiphon, which scholars have often used to 
argue the opposite view, and the analysis of some trials where mention of exile could 
be explained by the fact that they were held in absentia. To exclude that exile could 
be a penalty related to the eisangelia procedure is a precondition for arguing that 
evading trial, which was comparable to a sort of self-exile, was perceived as unlawful. 
However, it is necessary to define what I mean by lawful/unlawful. We may 
say that a conduct is unlawful when it openly violates an existing law. Thus saying 
that the choice of the defendant to leave the country and to avoid trial is unlawful 
presupposes that in Attic law there was a law that prohibited one from not attending 
trial. But is there any trace of such a law in the sources? I argue in the third section of 
this paper that Athenian law addressed this issue, as demonstrated by the existence of 
a law regulating the same matter in homicide cases. This law could be invoked as a 
useful touchstone for the eisangelia trials, although there are some significant 
differences due to the different nature of the two procedures – eisangelia was a public 
procedure, while trial for homicide was a private one. My main point is that if 
Athenian law was concerned with regulating when a defendant could legitimately 
abandon the trial in a homicide case, it is fair to suggest that it did so all the more in 
public trials for high treason, where the constraints on the defendant were probably 
even greater, since the offence concerned the whole community. Of course, evading 
trial was always interpreted as an admission of guilt by the defendant5, but someone 
accused of homicide could legitimately leave the country after the parties pronounced 
their first speeches and go into exile. Was it the same for defendants in eisangeliai 
trials? The existence of precautionary orders of imprisonment for those awaiting trial 
 
5  And. 1.3. 
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issued by the Assembly or by the Council would tend to exclude it6. This means that 
the individual who chose not to stand trial became strictu sensu a defaulter and his 
behaviour was considered unlawful.  
In the fourth section I analyse some ancient passages that allow us to state that 
defendants in high treason trials who evaded justice were likened to outlaws. 
Elements such as the practice of setting bounties on those who escaped trial, 
extradition requests for fugitives, the imposition of additional penalties such as 
confiscation of property and inscribing the fugitive’s name on a bronze stele, 
corroborate my assumption. In my last section I consider the law dealing with the 
persecution and seizure of a murderer, preserved in Demosthenes’ Against 
Aristocrates, which provides for protection from the risk of enslavement of those 
exiled for unintentional homicide. The paraphrase of the law by Demosthenes makes 
it evident that such protection was guaranteed only for those who went into exile after 
a formal sentence of the court and not for those who were charged with intentional 
homicide and chose self-exile in order to escape the death penalty. This law shows 
that even when self-exile was permitted it was not comparable to exile as a penalty. 
Lastly, I make some final observations on how a dike eremos was conducted and what 
happened when a person convicted in absentia tried to return to Athens.  
 
2. 
In his work on eisangelia in Athens, in regard to sentencing, Mogens H. 
Hansen has argued that eisangelia was an agōn timētos, a trial in which the penalty 
was not specified in the law, but was left to the parties involved to propose alternative 
penalties7. Normally, in an agōn timētos judges had to vote twice for a guilty verdict8: 
first they had to vote on the issue of the innocence or guilt of the defendant; then, they 
made a choice between the penalty proposed by the prosecution and that proposed by 
the defence. But, unlike other agōnes timētoi, Hansen has claimed that in eisangelia 
 
6  This occurred in the case of the Hermocopids (And. 1.11-18, 64), the generals of Arginusae 
(Xen. Hell. 1.7.3), Agoratus (Lys. 13.22-24). Cfr. HUNTER 1994, 143-144; ALLEN 2000, 201-
202. Clearly in these cases it did not qualify as a penalty, but as a preventive measure to keep 
the defendant from evading. 
7  HANSEN 1975, 33. The major work on eisangelia is HANSEN 1975 to which one has to add 
Hansen’s following papers containing some specifications, namely HANSEN 1979-1980, and 
1980. See also RHODES 1979. Other contributions are dedicated to specific points: SEALEY 
1981; CARAWAN 1987; PICCIRILLI 1987; BEARZOT 1996; PECORELLA LONGO 2002; PHILLIPS 
2006; WHITEHEAD 2006; ORANGES 2013; FARAGUNA 2016; VOLONAKI 2018. 
8  For the opportunity to translate the term δικαστής as judge rather than juror see CANEVARO 
2016, 178-179. 
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cases judges were not always obliged to vote twice to determine the sentence; 
sometimes the penalty was included in the indictment in the form of a decree of the 
Assembly or the Council9. In this case judges limited themselves to implementing 
what the Assembly or the Council had previously established. Because of the scarcity 
of evidence, it cannot be determined whether prosecutors were allowed to choose on 
each occasion which of these two procedures to apply or if the choice was regulated 
by a specific provision in the law.  
Despite this uncertainty, I believe it will be useful to take a look at what 
penalties were required in the few indictments preserved. In Phrynichus’ eisangelia, 
Critias charged not him but his corpse with treason (prodosia); the decree of the 
Assembly concerning his trial required that if he was found guilty his bones were to 
be dug up and removed from the boundaries of Attica10. This was what normally 
happened in accordance with the law on treason: defendants found guilty of prodosia 
incurred the penalty of ataphia, being deprived of burial in Attica, and their properties 
were confiscated11. After the in absentia deposition of the board of generals of 406/5 
through an apocheirotonia12, a decree of the Assembly disposed that if guilty the 
generals would be sentenced to death 13 . Likewise, according to Aeschines, 
Demosthenes passed a decree in the Assembly by which Anaxinus of Oreus would be 
given the death penalty if found guilty14. A similar pattern can be found in the case of 
the eisangelia against the board of generals of 411/10, which was presented to the 
Council15: according to Andron’s decree they were to be judged under the law on 
 
9  HANSEN 1975, 33 n. 33 has pointed to 6 cases in which it is possible to find the penalty 
mentioned in the indictment: the eisangeliai to the Assembly against Phrynicus of Deirades, 
the board of generals of 406/5 and Anaxinus of Oreus; the eisangeliai to the Council against 
Antiphon of Rhamnous, Archeptolemus of Agryle and Onomakles. The same possibility may 
have been extended to graphai. Cfr. SCAFURO 2004, 125 n. 21. For the paradox that the death 
penalty often was the result of an agōn timētos see KUCHARSKI 2015, 17-18. 
10  Lyc. 1.113. The Assembly decree was red out to the judges, as we learn from 1.114. Cfr. 
HANSEN 1975, 82-83; BAUMAN 1990, 68-69. 
11  For this law see Xen. Hell. 1.7.22. Cfr. Thuc. 1.138.6; Dio. Chrys. 31.85. For his part, Diod. 
16.25.3 cites a koinos nomos, which denied the right of burial to sacrilegious persons. Cfr. 
LIPSIUS 1984 [1908], 377-380; MACDOWELL 1978, 176-179; HELMIS 2007, 261; QUEYREL 
BOTTINEAU 2010, 105-106; KUCHARSKI 2014, 130. 
12  On trials of generals following their deposal through apocheirotonia see now SCAFURO 2018, 
203-205. She has challenged the traditional definition – after HANSEN 1975 - of these trials as 
eisangeliai and has argued that it would be preferable to speak of ‘trials by decree’. 
13  Xen. Hell. 1.7.9-10. Cfr. HANSEN 1975, 84-86. 
14  Aeschin. 3.224. Cfr. HANSEN 1975, 103. 
15  HANSEN 1975, 113-115. On the correctness of the procedural iter of this eisangelia see 
FARAGUNA 2016, 75. 
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treason16. If we look at the charge in these trials, we note that all the cases shared that 
of prodosia, and this allows us to conclude that when treason was at stake no penalty 
less than death could be taken into consideration. But why the need for a decree of the 
Assembly or the Council, in which it was specified that only death could be imposed 
in case of guilt? In my opinion, two main hypotheses can be formulated. The first is 
that the democratic bodies felt obliged to give a precise indication of the penalty to be 
imposed when the charge at hand was very serious, in the awareness that in an agōn 
timētos the parties involved in the trial could propose lighter sanctions. The second is 
that prosecutors were able to choose different penalties than death, such as exile17. 
While I am inclined to accept the first hypothesis, the last one cannot be ruled out 
aprioristically. Hansen’s catalogue, in fact, allows us to identify, with regard to 
eisangelia trials, penalties such as exile or a fine, besides death. But while references 
to a financial penalty, especially if the fine was quite affordable, are easily 
understandable, signifying that judges accepted the defence’s proposal, the meaning 
of exile in these trials is disputed. While some scholars, especially in the past, have 
argued that exile was effectively a penalty linked to political trials, now it is believed 
that the opposite is true18. Let me explain the leading hypothesis, which has been 
formulated by Hansen19. 
 
16  [Plut.] X Orat. 833EF. Cfr. HANSEN 1975, 113-115. This is an interesting case of a decree 
ordering the parties to act in accordance with a specific law. For a parallel see IG I3 84, ll. 17-
18, 23-24, where the law in question is that on precincts. On the authenticity of Andron’s 
decree see now FARAGUNA 2016, 73-76; 2017, 26-27. Contra HARRIS 2013b, 144 n. 7. 
17  It is useful here to recall the distinction between the eisangelia to the Council and the 
eisangelia to the Assembly in respect to both their substance and procedure. At any meeting of 
the Assembly any citizen epitimos could make a formal complaint or impeachment 
(eisangelia) to the Assembly. It could be employed against magistrates and private citizens for 
serious crimes (see n. 29). If the Assembly accepted the request of impeachment, it ordered 
the Council to draw up a probouleuma including the charge and fixing the sentence (HANSEN 
1975, 26). After the Assembly ratified the probouleuma, the case could be heard by the 
dikasterion or by the Assembly itself. See n. 13 for issue of eisangelia as an agōn timētos. The 
eisangelia to the Council could be presented at each meeting and was essentially directed 
against magistrates who had not carried out their duties in accordance with the law. The 
Council could make a definitive judgment in cases in which the penalty was up 500 drachmae 
(Dem. 47.42-43), but only if the magistrate under investigation did not appeal to the 
dikasterion (Arist. Ath. Pol. 45.2). If the penalty assessed was higher than 500 drachmae, the 
councillors passed the case to the thesmothetai, who introduced it to the dikasterion (Arist. 
Ath. Pol. 59.4). Cfr. CANEVARO 2016, 321-323. 
18  LÉCRIVAIN 1919, 350-352; 1940, 214-216. Lécrivain made a distinction between defendants 
who did not appear at the trial (les contumaces), whose exile was voluntary, and those who 
were subject to exile as a legal penalty, among whom he included individuals accused of 
treason. However, it is at least questionable that he included individuals such as Hipparchus or 
Themistocles in the first group despite the fact that they were accused of prodosia. Moreover, 
he failed to account for the relationship between the different procedures at stake and exile as 
a penalty. 
19  HANSEN 1975, 35-36. 
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According to the evidence on ancient trials undertaken in accordance with the 
eisangelia procedure, three types of sanctions occurred in case of a guilty verdict: 
death, exile or fine. This evidence should be read with a number of references in 
which the defendant fled the country before the trial. In such cases the law-court, after 
hearing only the prosecutor’s speech, pronounced a death sentence by default, which 
became immediately enforceable. Hansen excluded the possibility that exile could be 
one of the options available to both prosecution and defence. However, how can we 
interpret the several references to exile and to the condition of φυγάς of the 
defendant? Exile should be considered as a clue that the defendant fled the country 
before the trial and that judges passed a death sentence in absentia; since the capital 
sentence cannot be enforced due to the defendant’s failure to appear, the law-court 
commuted its previous verdict into exile. This would explain why we find in the 
sources contradictions on the penalty imposed. For example, Epicrates, Andocides, 
Cratinus and Euboulides, the Athenian ambassadors of 392/1, accused by Callistratus 
upon an eisangelia, are said by Demosthenes to have been sentenced to death, and by 
Philochorus to have been exiled20. Yet, as Hansen conceded, some trials do not fit this 
pattern21. The most glaring case is the trial of three members of the board of generals 
of 424/3, Eurymedon, Pythodorus and Sophocles, in charge of an Athenian squadron, 
which operated in Sicily. Our only source on this trial, Thucydides, argues that all the 
generals came back to Athens at the end of their assignment and were tried for having 
agreed to sign a peace with the Sicilians. Signing the peace was seen as a clear sign 
that the generals were corrupted and, accordingly, they were accused of bribery22, as 
was often the case with stratēgoi23. But the generals, each of whom was judged 
 
20  Dem. 19.277: κατὰ τουτὶ τὸ ψήφισμ’, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν πρέσβεων ἐκείνων ὑμεῖς 
θάνατον κατέγνωτε; Philoch. FGrH 328 fr. 149a: ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺ[ς πρέσ]βεις τοὺς ἐν 
Λακεδαίμονι συγχωρήσα[ντας] ἐφυγάδευσαν, Καλλιστράτου γράψαντος, κ[αὶ οὐ]χ 
ὑπομείναντας τὴν κρίσιν, Ἐπικράτην Κηφισιέα, Ἀνδοκίδην Κυδαθηναιέα, Κρατῖνον Σ̣φ̣ήττιον, 
Εὐβουλίδην Ἐλευσίνιο. Cfr. HANSEN 1975, 87-88. See also the other three examples made by 
HANSEN 1975, 36 n. 57 to support his argument.  
21  HANSEN 1975, 36. 
22  Thuc. 4.65.3 makes it evident that the charge against the stratēgoi was to have taken bribes or 
dōrodokia (δώροις πεισθέντες). Cfr. HANSEN 1975, 73. 
23  The charge of corruption appears to be often connected with that of treason against both the 
generals and the ambassadors. In the case of generals, it is interesting to note that the charge of 
treason was presented when they failed to accomplish the orders of the demos, as 
demonstrated by the fears expressed by Nicias in Thuc. 7.48.1-4, or to win the war. Cfr. 
BETTALLI 2017. On the perception of corruption in Athens see CUNIBERTI 2014, 2017 and 
2018 with discussion of previous bibliography. On the legal approach to the corruption in 
Athens see ORANGES 2016.   
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separately24, were not punished in the same way: all the defendants were found guilty, 
but, while Eurymedon was just fined, Pythodorus and Sophocles were condemned to 
exile25. Hansen has explained the different treatment that the Athenians reserved to 
Eurymedon with the fact that he was the only defendant to remain in Athens for the 
trial: once convicted of bribery, the judges accepted the penalty proposed presumably 
by his defence. On the other hand, Pythodorus and Sophocles, who may have returned 
to Athens from Sicily without staying for the trial, were judged in absentia and 
condemned to death. This is consistent with the generals’ widespread fear of being 
tried for corruption or treason if they returned to Athens without having successfully 
completed their mission. According to Nicias, there would be a real risk for generals 
to be unjustly put to death26. It should be added that it was difficult to determine the 
individual responsibilities of the generals, even if we admit that normally each 
defendant had the right to be judged separately27. It has been noted that ‘when a board 
of generals was in command, decisions were made by consensus’ 28 . Of course, 
generals did not always agree on the strategy to be followed29, but this is not the case 
with the generals of 424/3, as demonstrated by the fact that all three were condemned. 
 
24  In Attic law the defendant had the right to a separate trial. This can be deduced from the fact 
that in the Arginusae trial Callixenus’ proposal to judge all the generals together and not 
separately was branded as unconstitutional by Euryptolemus (Xen. Hell. 1.7.23, with regard to 
both the Cannonus decree and the law which applied to temple-robbers and traitors: τῷ νόμῳ 
κρινέσθων οἱ ἄνδρες κατὰ ἕνα ἕκαστον; Xen. Hell. 1.7.34, only with respect to the Cannonus’ 
decree: κατὰ τὸ Καννωνοῦ ψήφισμα κρίνεσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας δίχα ἕκαστον). On the decree see 
LAVELLE 1988. We should add to this, evidence of Dem. 22.38-39, according to which 
members of the Council had the right of an individual hearing in their euthynai, and Antiph. 
5.69-70, who attests that the hellenotamiai were tried separately. Cfr. RUBINSTEIN 2012, 333 
n. 9. 
25  Thuc. 4.65.3: ἐλθόντας δὲ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς μὲν φυγῇ ἐζημίωσαν,  
Πυθόδωρον καὶ Σοφοκλέα, τὸν δὲ τρίτον Εὐρυμέδοντα χρήματα ἐπράξαντο. This appears to 
be in some contradiction with what Philoch. FGrH 328 fr. 127 = schol. in Ar. Vesp. v. 240 
says about these stratēgoi, as he only mentions Sophocles and Pythodorus, while he says 
nothing about Eurymedon.  
26  Thuc. 7.48.4. It is the same fear Alcibiades and his associates have been feeling when the ship 
Salaminia went to Sicily to take them back (Thuc. 6.61.6: δείσαντες τὸ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ ἐς δίκην 
καταπλεῦσαι). 
27  The Athenians rarely resorted to collective sanctions. LANNI 2017, 12-20 has identified three 
main categories of crime for which the law provided a sanction of this kind: failure to pay 
debts owed to the State; serious crimes against the State, such as bribery and attempt to 
overthrow the democracy; failure of the boards of magistrates to carry out their duties. In this 
last group she has included the collective sanction imposed to the Arginusae generals, but she 
has considered it an exceptional case (pp. 19-20). As regards the meaning of the collective 
liability, scholars believed that collective penalties may have had a deterrent function and 
constituted an efficient incentive for other members of the board to report offences committed 
by their colleagues, especially in the case of ‘invisible offences’ or ‘victimless offences’. On 
this point see RUBINSTEIN 2012; LANNI 2017, 23 ff. and 2018, 162. 
28  HARRIS 2010, 410. 
29  HARRIS 2010, 411 for cases in which this consensus was not reached.  
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Moreover, we know from Thucydides that Eurymedon was again elected as stratēgos, 
while the other two generals are no longer mentioned30. It is more likely that the latter 
did not stay for his trial. If so, according to Hansen, reference to exile in their case 
should be understood as the usual commutation of the death penalty by default into 
exile. Thucydides may have omitted the procedural details of the trial, focusing 
instead on its outcome, namely a life in exile for both generals. But, as even Hansen 
recognizes, this trial might not have been prompted by an eisangelia, but by the final 
audit (euthynai) of the stratēgoi31. The relationship between the eisangelia and the 
euthyna procedure is far from clear and, while I am persuaded that serious crimes 
detected during the euthynai could result in an eisangelia32, it is difficult to determine 
which of these two procedures was employed to prosecute the stratēgoi of 424/3. In 
any case, despite knowing that euthyna could have been a plausible alternative, 
Hansen has treated this trial as an eisangelia.  
One of the most controversial issues of Hansen’s thesis concerns the 
assessment of the procedure employed in those treason trials that occurred before the 
democratic restoration. It was claimed that subversion of the democratic regime 
(katalysis tou dēmou) and treason (prodosia) - two of the three offences covered by 
the fourth-century law on eisangelia (nomos eisangeltikos)33  - were two different 
 
30  Thuc. 7.16.2, 31.3-5, 33.3, 35.1, 42.1, 43.2, 49.3, 52.2. 
31  The hypothesis all the three generals were prosecuted in the framework of their official 
scrutiny has been accepted by OSTWALD 1986, 64-65 n. 246, 221, 315, who has believed they 
may have been recalled to Athens after their failure of conquering Sicily, and BAUMAN 1990, 
85. On the contrary, HANSEN 1975, 73 n. 2 has suggested that the procedure used was a 
εἰσαγγελία προδοσίας. His view is followed by CARAWAN 1987, 176 n. 13; COBETTO GHIGGIA 
2017, 105-106 n. 23. See also ORANGES 2016, 89-91, who believes that it was undertaken 
upon an eisangelia in the framework of their final accounts. See also CATALDI 1996, 50 for 
the idea that the trial was a graphē dōrōn. 
32  On the euthyna as a preliminary investigative procedure see EFSTATHIOU 2007, 121-123. On 
the relation between euthyna and eisangelia see ORANGES 2013 (with regard to Cimon’s trial) 
and 2016; SCAFURO 2018, 214, limited to the relation between euthynai of deposed generals 
and eisangeliai. For the relation between euthyna and graphai see LODDO 2015, 114-117.  
33  The law concerning eisangelia is known by its fourth-century version through Hyp. 4.7-8; 
Theophr. Nomoi fr. 4b Szegedy-Maszak = Lex. Cant. s.v. εἰσαγγελία and Poll. 8.52; Dem. 
24.63. While fifth-century eisangelia could be employed for prosecuting a broader range of 
offences, including new offences for which no law existed (MACDOWELL 1978, 183-184 and 
RHODES 1979, 107-108 on the basis of what Caecilius of Calacte – Lex. Cant. s.v. εἰσαγγελία 
and Schol. Plat. Rep. 565c – says περὶ καινῶν ἀδικημάτων; contra HANSEN 1980, 91-93), the 
fourth-century law covered specific crimes: subversion of democracy; treason; taking bribes or 
speaking as a rhetor against the people’s interests. Cfr. HANSEN 1979-1980, 91-93; HARRIS 
2013a, 118-119, 167, 233-234. We know only two exceptions, which to further careful 
inspection do not turn out to be such (HARRIS 2013b, 146-148), as speakers tried to adapt 
descriptions of their cases to offences envisaged by the nomos eisangeltikos: Ariston and 
Lycurgus’ eisangelia against Lycophron in which the charge against the defendant was 
adultery (Hyp. 1) and Lycurgus’ eisangelia against Leocrates for having fled Athens to 
Rhodes right after Chaironeia. In the first case Hypereides complains that the expected 
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crimes, inasmuch as treason always presupposed an agreement with the enemy, while 
katalysis tou dēmou did not always imply an act of treason. Evidence of this can be 
found in the fact that katalysis tou dēmou and prodosia were prosecuted according to 
different laws: katalysis was punished on the basis of Solon’s alleged law on 
eisangelia34, the decree of Demophantus35, and the law of Eucrates36; prodosia (and 
hierosylia) was sanctioned through the law on temple-robbers and traitors 37 . If 
prodosia had been prosecuted through the law on temple-robbers and traitors, the 
penalties would have been exile, denial of burial (ataphia), and confiscation of 
property. It follows that the procedure used could not have been an eisangelia, which 
was an agōn timētos, but a public action on treason (graphē prodosias), which was an 
agōn atimētos38. Between 411/1039 and 403/2 alone, possibly after the trials against 
Antiphon and the generals of Arginusae, the instrument of the graphē was replaced by 
eisangelia for prosecuting treason40. Yet, this argument is not convincing. All the 
evidence we have about the existence of a graphē prodosias is a passage in Pollux’s 
Onomosticon dealing with a list of public actions41. But if we admitted that this 
passage is reliable, we would have to explain why there is no accurate record of 
historical graphai prodosias42. Finally, we should not overlook the fact that the choice 
of eisangelia was particularly advantageous for the prosecutor, as long as he ran no 
risk of punishment. From the second half of the fourth century, maybe after 333, in 
case of defeat, and of failure to obtain one-fifth of judges’ votes, the prosecutor only 
 
procedure to use was a public action (for the alternative procedure see PHILLIPS 2006, 381-
390), but Lycurgus would have presented it as a threat to citizenship and democracy (COOPER 
in WORTHINGTON – COOPER – HARRIS 2001, 70); in the latter case Lycurgus presented 
Leocrates’ departure from Athens in a time of crisis for the city as an act of treason (Lyc. 1.8-
9), and ‘stretched the meaning of treason to cover an action the Athenians did not normally 
associate with the term’ (HARRIS in WORTHINGTON – COOPER – HARRIS 2001, 159-160; 
WHITEHEAD 2006, 136 n. 18).  
34  Arist. Ath. Pol. 8.4. For the meaning of this law see LODDO 2018, 110-113. 
35  And. 1.96-98.  
36  SEG 12.87 = GHI 79. 
37  See supra p. 117 n. 11. 
38  Poll. 8.40. Already LIPSIUS 1984 [1908], 379 stated that ‘Dass aber gegen Verrat auch eine 
Schriftklage statthaft war, das dem Pollux nicht zu glauben, liegt keine Grund vor’. Cfr. also 
HANSEN 1975, 49. 
39  HANSEN 1975, 17. 
40  PICCIRILLI 1987, 36-49 and before him HARRISON 1971, 59; MACDOWELL 1978, 176-179, 
who has recognised the use of eisangelia for treason. Piccirilli has considered as graphai 
prodosias the trials against Hipparchus, Themistocles, Licidas, Thucydides, Phrynicus, 
Antiphon and his colleagues, and the board of the generals of the Arginusae, most of whom 
HANSEN 1975 has classified as eisangeliai. 
41  Poll. 8.40. 
42  KUCHARSKI 2014, 130-131 is perplexed about the use of this least known procedure and 
considered more likely recourse to eisangeliai in cases of treason. 
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incurred a fine of 1000 drachmae43, but, unlike public actions, he retained the right to 
bring charges of the same kind; before this date defeat in an eisangelia had entailed 
no unfavourable consequences for the prosecutor44. 
As regards exile in the eisangelia procedure, it has been argued, on the basis of 
a passage of Aeschines’ discourse Against Ctesiphon referring to the outcome of 
Leocrates’ trial, that it was an alternative sanction to death45. As is well known, 
Leocrates was charged of treason for having fled Athens at the time of the battle of 
Cheroneia, when news of Philip’s victory reached Athens, but he was put on trial only 
8 years after the events. The only reference to the outcome of this trial is provided by 
Aeschines, who, in reporting that Leocrates escaped conviction by one vote, states 
that: 
 
 ‘If a single vote had fallen the other way, he would have been put beyond 
our borders or condemned to death’46.  
 
This passage has been emended in various ways. The main difficulty concerns 
the interpretation of the apodosis ὑπερώριστ᾽ ἂν ἢ ἀπέθανεν. Around the middle of 
the nineteenth century Schaefer intervened to emend the passage, deleting ἢ 
ἀπέθανεν: he considered the expression as a gloss of the previous ὑπερώριστ᾽ ἂν, as if 
to say that whoever was punished with death could not be buried in Attica47. This 
emendation has been accepted by most subsequent editors48. Yet, more recently some 
scholars have questioned Schaefer’s correction, claiming that if we respect the text 
transmitted by the manuscripts the meaning of the apodosis is perfectly 
understandable, indicating that a different outcome of the trial would have involved 
the risk for Leocrates of being convicted to exile or death49. This implies that exile 
could be one of the options available to both the parties involved in an eisangelia. 
Hansen, for his part, has corrected the passage in another way, substituting for the 
 
43  Hyp. 1.8, 12; Poll. 8.52-53; Harp. sv. εἰσαγγελία. HANSEN 1975, 30, has argued that before 
333 all eisangeliai were azēmioi on the basis of Dem. 18.250, recently followed by VOLONAKI 
2018, 294. But RUBINSTEIN 2000, 116-117 is probably right when she says that evidence of 
Theophrastos should be considered as a terminus post quem for the introduction of this fine. 
44  HANSEN 1975, 29-30. 
45  PICCIRILLI 1987, 36-49; SULLIVAN 2002, 5; BIANCHI 2002; ORANGES 2016, 90-91 n. 70. 
46  Aeschin. 3.252: εἰ δὲ μία ψῆφος μετέπεσεν, ὑπερώριστ᾽ ἂν ἢ ἀπέθανεν (translated by Carey 
2000). 
47  Status quaestionis in BIANCHI 2002, 84-85. 
48  Cfr. BIANCHI 2002, 85 n. 8. 
49  PICCIRILLI 1987, 48; BIANCHI 2002. 
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aorist indicative (ἀπέθανεν) an aorist participle (ἀποθανών), which allows him to 
maintain his point, i.e., that ὑπερορίζειν means to drive beyond the borders of the 
country50.  
But what is the meaning of the verb ὑπερορίζειν? This also is hotly debated. 
Erika Bianchi believed that the main meaning of the verb is ‘to banish’. She 
substantiated this by the fact that among the seven occurrences of the verb in the 
sources of the Classical period most of them do mean ‘to exile’, ‘to banish’ 51 . 
However, three of the seven occurrences are in Aeschines’ Against Ctesiphon. At 
3.131 about Demosthenes, the curse of Greece (ῶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλειτήριε), Aeschines 
wonders if, for his misdeeds, he should ‘be crowned as a result of the city’s 
misfortunes, or cast beyond the borders (ὑπερωρίσθαι, cfr. Din. 1.77)’. One must 
wonder if this is in fact a technical use of ὑπερορίζειν. In other words, can 
ὑπερορίζειν be a synonym for φεύγειν or φυγαδεύειν? It rather seems to me that here 
the verb is used to indicate the broad concept of casting away someone and has 
nothing to do with formal banishment, something that needs to be proven52. More 
interestingly, at 3.244 Aeschines asks the judges to envision the reaction of the war 
dead to the granting of a crown to Demosthenes, who had provoked their death by his 
reckless conduct; he contrasts the rationale of such a grant with the habit of removing 
from the boundaries of Attica senseless objects - a piece of wood, a stone or iron  -, 
which fall on someone, causing their death. Even in this case, he uses the form 
ὑπερορίζομεν. It is noteworthy that the verb is put in connection with inanimate 
objects that are expelled from Attica in a kind of metaphorical exile53. Other passages 
show that Aeschines’ use is not an isolated case54. Finally, at 3.252 Aeschines recalls 
the trial of Leocrates, who became notorious for having escaped conviction because 
 
50  HANSEN 1975, 35. 
51  BIANCHI 2002, 87-88 cites as evidence: Isoc. 6.32: ἔτι δὲ τοὺς ἠσεβηκότας εἰς τοὺς παῖδας 
τοὺς Ἡρακλέους ἐκβεβληκότες, οἳ δικαίως ἂν ἐξ ἁπάσης τῆς οἰκουμένης ὑπερωρίσθησαν; 
Plat. Resp. 560d: μετριότητα δὲ καὶ κοσμίαν δαπάνην ὡς ἀγροικίαν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν οὖσαν 
πείθοντες ὑπερορίζουσι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν; Σφόδρα γε. She also cites 
Ctesias FGrH 688 fr. 14a, but the sentence Κυρταία· πόλις ἐν τῆς Ἐρυθρᾶι θαλάσσηι, εἰς ἣν 
ὑπερώρισεν Ἀρταξέρξης Μεγάβυζον is rather the explication of Stephanus of Byzanthium to 
the word Κυρταία that he found in Ctesias’ Persica. By that I mean the word ὑπερώρισεν is 
not an example from the Classical period, as Bianchi maintains, but Stephanus’ own use.  
52  I agree with TODD 2016, 341 n. 81 about the fact that compounds in –horizō referred to “the 
casting out of bodies rather than to the exile of living persons”. 
53  This use is similar to that of the above-mentioned passage of Plato’s Republic, where 
ὑπερορίζειν (here ‘to cast out’) is referred to moral concepts. Cfr. also Paus. 6.11.6, in which it 
is said that the Thasians threw into the sea Theagenes’ statue, which had caused the death of a 
citizen. In doing so they would follow Dracon’s laws on homicide. 
54  Paus. 6.11.6; Poll. 8.120. These passages are already identified by HAGER 1879, 3. 
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of Athena’s vote55: the verdict was tied (isopsēphos dikē) and he was acquitted56. A 
recent proposal to reject Schaefer’s emendation and accept the text transmitted by 
manuscripts is appropriate here, as there is no reason to correct a text when its 
meaning is understandable. However, I am not convinced of the resulting 
interpretation, which fails to explain the connection of this passage with what we 
know about the eisangelia procedure through which Leocrates was prosecuted. I 
suggest instead that this sentence should be understood as referring to the fate of 
traitors once they are convicted: they could be condemned to death or could suffer the 
additional penalty of ataphia.  
When treason was prosecuted by eisangelia, the prosecutor always proposed 
death, as fourth-century evidence on eisangeliai prodosias demonstrates57; this could 
be accompanied by confiscation of property (δήμευσις), ataphia, razing of the house 
(κατασκαφή)58, sometimes setting up of pillars (ὅροι), and disfranchisement of one’s 
offspring59. Something similar also concerns Athens’ international relations with its 
allies.  The decree for constituting the second Athenian League provides exile or 
death for those allies who defect, but it is noteworthy that ataphia – the decree 
extended the ban to Attica and to territories included in the alliance - was limited only 
 
55  Reference here is to the vote of the judges in Aeschylus’ Eumenides, where Orestes is said to 
win the case thanks to Athena’s vote (Aesch. Eum. vv. 741, 752–753, 795–796).  
56  The tied vote in a trial was quite rare. Its meaning is far from clear, as normally there was an 
odd number of judges Cfr. BOEGEHOLD 1995, 34; WHITEHEAD 2006, 133 n. 4. Scholars have 
offered several explanations about it: Athena’s vote in Orestes’ trial produced the tied vote 
(GAGARIN 1975); Aeschines refers to the second vote in Leocrates’ eisangelia where judges 
had to determine punishment (SULLIVAN 2002, but see contra BIANCHI 2002, WHITEHEAD 
2006, 133 n. 4; HARRIS 2013a, 240-241 n. 71); Aeschines here is not accurate in reporting the 
vote and there was simply one more vote for acquittal (FILONIK 2017, 251 n. 94). 
57  See supra p. 118. In addition to these, one should consider the case of Nicophemus and 
Aristophanes about which Lys. 19.7 says that ‘they were put to death without trial (ἄκριτοι) 
before anyone could come to their aid as the proof of their guilt was being made out. For 
nobody even saw them again after their arrest, since their bodies were not even delivered for 
burial (οὐδὲ γὰρ θάψαι τὰ σώματ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀπέδοσαν): so awful has their calamity been that, in 
addition to the rest, they have suffered this privation also’. The context for this speech allows 
us to suggest that Nicophemus and Aristophanes were considered traitors for not having 
fulfilled their mission in support of Evagoras of Cyprus in 390, for which see Xen. Hell. 
4.8.24. Cfr. QUEYREL BOTTINEAU 2010, 279, 459; BEARZOT 2015, 156 n. 48. I suggest that 
the execution without trial may have occurred while they were in Cyprus, something that can 
also explain the failure to return the corpses to their family. For this view see TODD 2000a, 
200, although he is expressed this more cautiously. Contra MEDDA 20075, 127. 
58  On the additional penalties see MACDOWELL 1978, 255-256; KUCHARSKI 2015, 20, although I 
do not find suitable his definition of embellishments for these penalties. For the razing of a 
house see CONNOR 1985. I cannot agree with the view expressed by FORSDYKE 2012, 159, 
that the razing of a house was an example of popular justice (as many other punishments that 
she has interpreted as acts of extra-legal justice (pp. 144-170). For a harsh criticism of 
Forsdyke’s view see HARRIS 2019, 108-109. 
59  This is the case of the eisangelia against Antiphon and Archeptolemus according to Plut. Mor. 
833a. For the meaning of this provision see FARAGUNA 2016, 82-86. 
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to those condemned to death60. Denial of burial is also attested outside Attica both in 
Corinth and in Syracuse 61 . The penalty of ataphia is also found in the city of 
Magnesia, where the law provides for an analogous provision for murderers of 
relatives62. 
It should not be surprising that in the above-mentioned passage in Aeschines’ 
Against Ctesiphon mention of ataphia precedes that of the death penalty; the logical 
order of the sentence corresponds to a hysteron proteron, something that is not 
unusual in Ancient Greek. As regards its meaning, I suppose that Aeschines refers to 
two alternatives, both linked to the consequences of the death penalty. In the case of 
traitors found guilty, the only possible penalty was death, but it was highly important 
what to do with their corpses. Danielle Allen has rightly pointed out that for the 
Athenians the important thing was not how wrongdoers were executed, but how to 
handle their corpses 63 . We know that during the fifth century the bodies of the 
condemned were thrown into a natural chasm, the barathron, while in the fourth 
century they were deposited in the orygma, an artificial cave of which Plato speaks64. 
It is debated whether precipitation in the barathron or in the orygma was a method of 
 
60  IG II2 43, ll. 57-63: κρινέσθω ἐν Ἀθην[αίο]ις καὶ τ[οῖς] συμμάχοις ὡς διαλύων τὴν 
συμμαχία[ν, ζ]ημιόντων δὲ αὐτὸν θανάτωι ἢ φυγῆι ο ̔͂[περ] Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι 
κρατὁ͂σι[ν· ἐὰν] δὲ θανάτο τιμηθῆι, μὴ ταφήτω ἐν τῆ[ι Ἀττι]κῆι [μ]ηδὲ ἐν τῆι τῶν συμμάχων. 
61  See what happened to Cypselus (Nicolaus Dam. FGrH 90 fr. 60: Ὁ δὲ δῆμος τάς τε οἰκίας τῶν 
τυράννων κατέσκαψε, καὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἐδήμευσεν, ἄταφόν τε ἐξώρισε τὸν Κύψελον, καὶ τῶν 
προγόνων τοὺς τάφους ἀνορύξας, τὰ ὀστᾶ ἐξέρριψεν) and Dionysius I (Plut. De sera 559D: εἰ 
δὲ μὴ δόξαιμι παίζειν, ἐγὼ φαίην ἂν ἀνδριάντα Κασάνδρου καταχαλκευόμενον ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων 
πάσχειν ἀδικώτερα καὶ τὸ Διονυσίου σῶμα μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν ἐξοριζόμενον ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων 
ἢ τοὺς ἐκγόνους αὐτῶν δίκην τίνοντας). In the case of Dionysius I the verb used is ἐξορίζειν to 
indicate that his corpse was cast outside the borders of Syracuse. This passage is evidence for 
the practice of κατασκαφή, which involved both houses and tombs. On their ruins Timoleon 
ordered law-courts to be built. For a collection of sources on such practices see CONNOR 1985, 
especially p. 83 for this episode. It is not clear from the context if the Dionysius cited is 
Dionysius I or Dionysius II. While Plutarch mentions Dionysius II’s sons, Nysaius and 
Apollocrates, it was likely it Dionysius I who suffered that fate. Effectively, Dionysius II died 
in exile in Corinth. Maybe Plutarch is referring here to what Timoleon and the Syracusans did 
in 343/2 against the tombs of the tyrants (τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὰ μνήματα τῶν τυράννων ἀνέτρεψαν 
καὶ κατέσκαψαν, Plut. Tim. 22.2). On the meaning of this passage with regard to Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric see CROMEY 1979, 16. For identifying this Dionysius as Dionysius I see MUCCIOLI 
1999, 480 n. 1347. 
62  Plat. Leg. 9.873b-c: ἐὰν δέ τις ὄφλῃ φόνου τοιούτου, τούτων κτείνας τινά, οἱ μὲν τῶν 
δικαστῶν ὑπηρέται καὶ ἄρχοντες ἀποκτείναντες, εἰς τεταγμένην τρίοδον ἔξω τῆς πόλεως 
ἐκβαλλόντων γυμνόν, αἱ δὲ ἀρχαὶ πᾶσαι ὑπὲρ ὅλης τῆς πόλεως, λίθον ἕκαστος φέρων, ἐπὶ τὴν 
κεφαλὴν τοῦ νεκροῦ βάλλων ἀφοσιούτω τὴν πόλιν ὅλην, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο εἰς τὰ τῆς χώρας ὅρια 
φέροντες ἐκβαλλόντων τῷ νόμῳ ἄταφον. A similar penalty was applied to suicide victims 
(Plat. Leg. 9.874c-d). 
63  ALLEN 2000, 218. 
64  Plat. Rep. 4.439e. See ALLEN 2000, 393 n. 83 for evidence about barathron and orygma. 
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execution or they were only used for the disposal of the corpses65. What we read in 
Xenophon’s Hellenica concerning the Cannonus decree is not conclusive: reference to 
the fact that those condemned were to be thrown into the barathron does not prove 
that they were precipitated alive66. To get back to Aeschines’ passage, I suggest that 
while the verb ἀπέθανεν implies that the corpse of Leocrates could be placed within 
the city in the orygma or returned to his family, ὑπερώριστ᾽ ἂν alludes to the fact that 
he could be condemned to the most severe form of ataphia, i.e., disposal of the corpse 
near the border of Attica. Indeed, Plato describes this place as situated on the road that 
goes from Piraeus under the outer side of the northern wall. Archaeological 
excavation has discovered a small triangular outcropping on mount Beletsi, bearing an 
inscription that reads bar, possibly a piece of the word barathron. The outcropping 
overlooks a drop situated at the north side of the fortification and looking northwest 
toward Kapandriti, which was the border of Attica67. I think wrongdoers such as 
Leocrates could have been thrown into this chasm: the more appropriate penalty for 
those who abandoned Athens in face of danger was to deny them burial in Attica after 
execution. This is consistent with ancient explanations of this passage. The scholiast 
comments ὑπερώριστ᾽ ἄν as follows:  
 
‘Traitors were buried not in their homeland, but outside of its borders’68.  
 
Accordingly, there is no reason to suppose that Aeschines alludes here to exile as an 
alternative to the death penalty69. 
 
65  MACDOWELL 1978, 254; TODD 1993, 141 and 2000b, 37-39; ALLEN 2000, 218-219, 
expressing the view that execution by precipitation was not an Athenian feature, but it was 
characteristic of other poleis. Contra CANTARELLA 1991, 96-105, especially p. 102, who 
believes that both barathron and orygma were employed for execution by precipitation. For a 
middle view see KUCHARSKI 2015, 28, who believes that precipitation was used only early in 
the fifth century, for example in the case of Miltiades’ execution, but after the middle of the 
century this practice was abandoned. 
66  Cfr. supra p. 120 n. 24 and ALLEN 2000, 324-325. Indeed those who think that this passage 
indicates execution by precipitation base their view on the text edited by Dobree for Teubner 
(see CANTARELLA 1991, 372 n. 20), while manuscripts that read as follows ἀποθανόντα εἰς τὸ 
βάραθρον ἐμβληθῆναι support the hypothesis that those condemned to death were thrown into 
barathron after dead. Cfr. TODD 2000b, 38 n. 26. 
67  ALLEN 2000, 220-221. 
68  Schol. in Aeschin. 3.252 (Dilts): οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πατρίδι οἱ προδόται ἐθάπτοντο, ἀλλ ἐν τῇ 
ὑπερορίᾳ. 
69  Even those who believe that Aeschines refers to exile as an alternative penalty to capital 
punishment recognize that this did not correspond to the Athenian legal practice, but rather it 
should consider as part of his rhetorical strategy. See BIANCHI 2002, 94. 
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If exile was not a penalty in an eisangelia, we should agree with Hansen that 
mention of exile in the sources is to be considered a kind of commutation of the death 
penalty when the defender failed to face trial. Such commutation, which Hansen 
believed to be automatic, seems to be confirmed by three trials: those against Gylon 
of Cerameis, the board of generals of 379/8, and Callistratus of Aphidna70. Aeschines, 
in his attempt to call into question the legitimacy of Demosthenes’ citizenship on his 
maternal side, reports that his grandfather Gylon was charged with prodosia for 
having handed over Nymphaius, a fort in Pontus, to the enemy. Prosecuted by an 
eisangelia, he left Athens in order to escape conviction; consequently, he was 
condemned to death in absentia and became an exile (φυγὰς ἀπ’εἰσαγγελίας) 71 . 
Plutarch also speaks of this Gylon in his Life of Demosthenes and cites Aeschines as a 
source. Despite this, Plutarch states that Gylon was banished on a charge of treason 
(ἐπ’αἰτίᾳ προδοσίας φεύγοντος)72. This alternation in the sources between the death 
penalty and exile can be explained by the fact that Plutarch misinterprets Aeschines’ 
words (φυγὰς ἀπ’εἰσαγγελίας) or focuses on Gylon’s status rather than on the 
procedural details73. 
Likewise, exile and the death penalty were equally connected with sanctions in the 
eisangelia against two generals who operated at the border with Boiotia at the time of 
the counter-coup by which democracy was restored in Thebes74. We do not know who 
brought the charge and any attempt to identify the prosecutor may be only conjectural. 
Despite this, I suggest the prosecutor could have been Callistratus of Aphidna or one 
of his faction, whose anti-Theban feelings are well known75. It is possible, in fact, that 
Callistratus was the politician who showed his anti-Theban views most openly; on the 
contrary, Cephalus, who proposed issuing a decree to send an Athenian force to 
 
70  HANSEN 1975, 36 n. 57, 83-84, 94-95. 
71  Aeschin. 3.171. 
72  Plut. Dem. 4.2. Cfr. Liban. Dem. 3: Γύλωνος τοῦ πάππου τοῦ Δημοσθένους φυγόντος μὲν ἐξ 
Ἀθηνῶν ἐπὶ προδοσίας ἐγκλήματι. 
73  According to HANSEN 1975, 83-84 this trial can be dated between 410-405.  
74  HANSEN 1975, 90. 
75  GEORGIADOU 1997, 100 cites Plut. Praec. ger. reip. 810F as evidence of Callistratus’ hostility 
towards Theban exiles. Plutarch reports an exchange of words between Callistratus and 
Epaminondas, in which Callistratus rebuked the Thebans and the Argives for the mythical 
parricide of Oedipus and the matricide of Clytemnestra, and Epaminondas replies saying that 
the Thebans expelled the authors of these misdeeds, while the Athenians accepted them. It is 
probable that this episode refers to a debate that occurred in 357 in the Arcadian Assembly, 
between Callistratus as Athenian ambassador and Epaminondas, on which see Nep. Ep. 6; 
Plut. Apopht. 193CD. Cfr. TUCI 2019, 40-41. 
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Thebes in order to overthrow Leontiades’ regime 76 , could have been one of the 
demagogues Plutarch speaks of77. Initially, the Athenians sheltered the Theban exiles 
in return for the favour received by them at the time of the Thirty78. These generals 
were charged for having joined the Theban exiles in the uprising against Leontiades’ 
oligarchic faction without Athens’ formal authorization79. In describing Athens’ new 
political policy toward Thebes, when the Spartan Cleombrotus, after having retaken 
control of Corinth, was about to pass into Boiotia, Xenophon observes that the 
Athenians were so alarmed that they put on trial both of the stratēgoi80: one was 
condemned to death and the other, not remaining to stand trial (ἐπεὶ οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν), 
became an exile 81 . On the contrary, Plutarch, who does not seem to have used 
Xenophon on this point82, states that the Athenians, in the grip of fear, broke the 
alliance with Thebes83, tried those who sided with the Boiotians and “put some of 
them to death, banished others, and others still they fined”84. It is hard to reconcile the 
two reports, which present several discrepancies. It has been noted that Plutarch is 
careful to avoid speaking about any possible Athenian assistance given to the exiles; 
accordingly he refers to a faction of boiotiazontes in a generic way85. What is certain 
is that we know of no notice about a flood of court cases that took place in Athens 
after the liberation of Thebes. Such punitive justice would have left a mark in the 
sources. It does not align with Athens’ new anti-Spartan policy immediately after 
Sphodrias’ raid86. For all these reasons I agree with Hansen in preferring Xenophon’s 
version, which is the oldest source for the events. So it follows that one of these two 
 
76  Din. 1.38-39. Cfr. Diod. 15.26.1, who recalls the vote in the Assembly on the grant of aid to 
Theban exiles without mentioning Cephalus. 
77  Plut. Pel. 7.1. 
78  On this topic see now BEARZOT 2020.  
79  On this episode see LODDO 2019b, 10-11 and 2020, 211-212 with further references. 
80  In this regard BUCK 1994, 86-87 is probably right in believing that at the beginning Athens 
had sent unofficial aid to the democrats, maybe in support of those democratic exiles who had 
taken refuge in Athens. However, then the Athenians gave some concrete and official aid: they 
deliberated, on Cephalus’ proposal, to send some troops in Boiotia in support of Theban 
exiles; they dispatched Athenian peltasts, led by the stratēgos Chabrias, who guarded the fort 
of Eleutheria at the borders of Attica with Boiotia. Cfr. also GEORGIADOU 1997, 133. 
81  Xen. Hell. 5.4.19. 
82  On the sources of the Life of Pelopidas see GEORGIADOU 1997, 15-28, who has excluded 
Plutarch’s use of Xenophon as his main source and has considered more likely that the 
biographer used Callisthenes’ Hellenica. For Plutarch’s extensive use of Theopompus see 
SORDI 1995. 
83  But we have no idea whether and when such an alliance was made up. For a summary of the 
debate on this topic see GEORGIADOU 1997, 134. 
84  Plut. Pel. 14.1 (translated by B. Perrin). 
85  GEORGIADOU 1997, 134. 
86  SEALEY 1956, 188.  
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stratēgoi was tried and condemned to death while the other was condemned to death 
in absentia. Consequently, Xenophon observes that the latter became an exile. 
Even clearer is Callistratus’ eisangelia of 362/1. He was charged by an 
anonymous (for us) prosecutor for having made proposals contrary to the people’s 
interests in his capacity as rhētōr, and having taken bribes87. Our main source is 
Hypereides’ discourse On behalf of Euxenippus, which includes a list of well-known 
politicians who were prosecuted by eisangelia. Hypereides’ main point is that in his 
day eisangelia has lost its importance as it has been trivialised88. To prove it he refers, 
among other things89, to the fact that in the past the habit of the defendants in an 
eisangelia was to leave the country before trial, in the belief that it would have been 
difficult for them to avoid conviction. This is why the charges at stake were the most 
severe. It is in this framework that Hypereides cites the example of Callistratus’ 
eisangelia, who, like Timomachus, Leosthenes, Philon, and Theotimus, did not await 
trial and went into exile. The orator Lycurgus expresses a similar view in his 
discourse Against Leocrates, when says that “the city condemned him to death, but he 
fled into exile”90. 
Excluding that exile was a penalty in the eisangelia procedure makes it 
mandatory to reassess the nature of the eisangelia as an agōn timētos. I suggest that 
not all eisangeliai were agōnes timētoi. Eisangeliai derived from a formal deposition 
(apocheirotonia) were always timētoi91, while eisangeliai to the Assembly could be 
both timētoi and atimētoi. If the determination of the sentence was entrusted to the 
parties, the prosecutor usually required the death penalty, while the defendant 
proposed a fine92. But, to judge from the evidence, when the issue at stake was treason 
or impiety, the prosecutors could specify the penalty clause in the indictment and this 
 
87  HANSEN 1975, 94-95. 
88  On the trivialisation of eisangelia in the second half of the fourth century see VOLONAKI 2018. 
89  Hyp. 4.3: “But today, what’s happening in the city is absolutely ridiculous. Diognides and 
Antidorus, the metic, are accused of hiring out flute girls for more than the price prescribed by 
the law, Agasicles of Piraeus for being registered in the deme Halimus, and Euxenippus 
because of the dreams he says he saw. Not one of these charges, of course, has anything to do 
with the impeachment law”. 
90  Lyc. 1.93. 
91  Arist. Ath. Pol. 61.2. 
92  In other words, this is the same pattern we can see in eisangeliai derived from 
apocheirotoniai. 
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penalty normally was death 93 . In these cases, therefore, eisangelia was an agōn 
atimētos. 
This helps us to understand why Socrates’ trial cannot be used as evidence that 
exile was one of the penalties proposed in the timēsis of an eisangelia. In 399 Socrates 
was tried by an Athenian law-court for impiety (asebeia) in the form of a public 
action for impiety (graphē asebeias)94. After the first speeches by prosecution and 
defence, the judges voted on the verdict by secret ballot. For thirty votes the law-court 
issued a sentence of conviction against Socrates95. Because the graphē asebeias was 
an agōn timētos, the parties in the trial had to give their second speeches and to 
propose the penalty. Meletus, the main prosecutor, proposed the death penalty, while 
Socrates made an unconventional proposal: at the beginning he claimed to deserve a 
reward rather than a penalty for his deeds and proposed to receive the public 
maintenance (sitēsis) at the Prytaneion; then, he imagined taking into consideration 
alternative sanctions such as a fine with prison until he paid for it and exile, but he 
rejected them as bad solutions; finally, on the advice of his friends, he proposed to be 
fined with thirty minae 96 . The judges accepted the prosecutor’s proposal and 
condemned Socrates to death. He was taken into custody in the desmōtērion until his 
 
93  Evidence of fourth-century eisangeliai for treason in fact shows that the prosecution always 
proposed the death penalty. Sometimes confiscation of property was added to death. See the 
trials of the board of ambassadors of 392/1 (death in absentia, as they fled the country before 
the trial, cfr. HANSEN 1975, 87-88); Antimachus (death and confiscation of property, cfr. 
HANSEN 1975, 91-92), Timagoras (death, cfr. HANSEN 1975, 92), Callisthenes (death, cfr. 
HANSEN 1975, 93-94), Leosthenes, Philon, Timomachus, and Theotimus (death in absentia, as 
they fled the country before the trial, cfr. HANSEN 1975, 95-98). Callistratus, Chabrias, and 
Iphicrates were acquitted, but it has been suggested that the prosecutors proposed capital 
punishment in all the three trials (HANSEN 1975, 92-93, 100). Some cases are doubtful. Dem. 
19.180-181 (καὶ ὅσοι διὰ ταῦτ’ ἀπολώλασι παρ’ ὑμῖν, οἱ δὲ χρήματα πάμπολλ’ ὠφλήκασιν, οὐ 
χαλεπὸν δεῖξαι, Ἐργόφιλος, Κηφισόδοτος, Τιμόμαχος, τὸ παλαιόν ποτ’ Ἐργοκλῆς, Διονύσιος, 
ἄλλοι, οὓς ὀλίγου δέω σύμπαντας εἰπεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν πόλιν βεβλαφέναι τούτου) speaks of 
several politicians tried by eisangelia, probably to the Assembly, but this source does not 
allow us understanding what punishment was applied in each case. As a matter of fact we 
know of trials in which defendants were punished with a heavy fine. This is what happened to 
Cephisodotus (fine of five talents, cfr. HANSEN 1975, 98; but I guess that the Assembly 
reversed the original verdict, as schol. in Aeschin. 3.51 (Dilts) seems to attest: τῆς μὲν 
θανατικῆς ζημίας ἀπελύθη), and Timotheus (fine of 100 talents; Timotheus being not able to 
pay the fine went into exile to Chalkis; cfr. HANSEN 1975, 101; the fine was repaid by his son 
Conon after being reduced to 10 talents, cfr. PECORELLA LONGO 2004, 93-94). But we should 
point out that both trials resulted by an apocheirotonia. 
94  Diog. Laer. 2.40. Further sources are cited in FILONIK 2013, 53 n. 157. While in the fifth 
century impiety was prosecuted by the eisangelia procedure, at least after the promulgation of 
Diopithes’ decree, in the fourth century we only know of public actions (graphai) for impiety. 
MACDOWELL 1978, 201 has suggested that until Diopithes’ decree was in force, impiety was 
prosecuted by eisangelia; such a decree may have lapsed in 403 when the revision of the 
Athenian law code took place. 
95  Plat. Apol. 36A 1-5. 
96  Plat. Apol. 37C-E. 
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execution. While he was in prison his friend advised him to escape from prison and 
leave Athens, but once again Socrates refused to evade justice97. A few days later he 
died, poisoned by hemlock. Yet, should we consider Socrates’ claim, which he may 
have proposed exile in the timēsis, as a clue that exile could be one of the sanctions to 
be proposed in the assessment of the penalty? I think we should in the case of public 
actions, but Socrates’ trial tells us nothing about exile in the eisangelia procedure. 
In the light of the evidence above, I believe Hansen was right in postulating a 
close connection between a defendant’s failure to stand trial, his voluntary flight and 
his consequent death sentence in absentia. But are we entitled to suppose an 
automatic commutation of the sentence? Some scholars have assumed that voluntary 
exile could be an option available to those condemned to capital punishment as a 
“milder substitute”98. They could simply flee the country before trial choosing exile in 
the place of death; in return, the law-court passed a death judgment in absentia. 
Furthermore, such behaviour in procedures involving capital punishment has been 
compared to that of defendants in a homicide case. This view, apparently, is based on 
the consideration that there is abundant evidence that defendants made recourse to this 
option99.  
However, it has to be asked if the city, in response to the defendant’s voluntary 
flight, reconsidered its verdict in an official way, by commuting the death penalty into 
a formal exile100. If so, it follows that, in fleeing the country and avoiding trial, 
defendants acted in a legal way. But, I wonder, did Athens renounce any forms of 
retaliation against such a defendant, who was definitively a wrongdoer and an enemy 
of the city? 
 
3. 
Before attempting to answer this question, I think a few points need to be 
made clearer. First, to claim that exile was not a penalty foreseen by the eisangelia 
procedure does not amount to saying that it could not have been a penalty in other 
 
97  Xen. Apol. 23.  
98  TODD 1993, 139-140; KUCHARSKI 2014 and 2015, 19. 
99  KUCHARSKI 2015, 19 n. 24 presents as evidence the list of politicians who escaped conviction 
in an eisangelia fleeing abroad in Hypereides’ On behalf of Euxenippus.  
100  I am not referring here to the practice of aphesis, by which the Assembly could reverse the 
original sentence of the court. Although we know of some cases in which aphesis was applied, 
it must be acknowledged that in principle the Athenians were reluctant to pardon their fellow 
citizens. When they did so, it was not so much out of magnanimity as out of necessity or 
utility. Cfr. PECORELLA LONGO 2004, 108. 
 Laura Loddo  133 
 
Dike - 22 (2019): 113-160 
procedures of Attic law. I refer here to those legal situations in which the polis 
imposed formal exile (φυγή) as the result of a judicial process or a formal deliberation 
of an institutional body such as the Assembly. Such an exile implied the expulsion for 
the individual condemned from the territory of the polis and could be associated with 
supplemental provisions such as confiscation of his property and extension of the 
exile to his descendants. In Athens exile could be the sanction imposed for some types 
of homicide (unintentional homicide or phonos akousios; homicide by bouleusis: 
homicide of a foreigner or a resident alien101). In certain cases homicide could be 
sanctioned by perpetual exile102. Moreover, it appears to be linked to trauma ek 
pronoias (intentional wounding) of a citizen103. This penalty guaranteed that some of 
the condemned individual’s rights would be safeguarded as long as he respected the 
limitations imposed by law, such as the right not to be killed with impunity, in line 
with the right of any Athenian citizen. 
Exile could be also connected with outlawry and atimia104. Outlawry deprived 
the convicted person of all civic rights and the legal protections that the polis 
guaranteed to each citizen. As a result of this, anyone could kill him with impunity. 
Outlawry was related to exile in the sense that a person who suffered such a penalty 
could no longer continue to remain in Attica. As for exile, outlawry too could be 
extended hereditarily to the outlaw’s family’s members.  
Finally, atimia should be considered a disfranchisement involving the loss of 
some civic rights. In this case, exile was not linked to disfranchisement directly, but 
could become one of its consequences. To lose some civic rights as the possibility to 
 
101  WHITEHEAD 1977, 93. 
102  Dem. 21.43. 
103  PHILLIPS 2006. 
104  According to the traditional view, the term atimia originally meant ‘without punishment’ and 
it was tantamount to banning the citizen from the community (SWOBODA 1893). The meaning 
of atimia would have evolved from an absolute form, which can be linked to outlawry and 
implied a total loss of juridical protection, in a milder form that was expressed in some 
limitations to the political and/or social citizen rights. This view, which has been accepted by 
most scholars (e.g. HARRISON 1971, 169-170; PICCIRILLI 1976, 741-743), albeit with some 
adjustments – I refer to the shift of the concept of atimia from the legal sphere to the moral 
one with the meaning of dishonour or more precisely loss of τιμή (MAFFI 1983; PODDIGHE 
2001, 38-40) -, has been questioned in recent times by several scholars. According to 
DMITRIEV 2015, 35-50, since the two meanings of atimia continued to exist in the Classical 
Age, it should be considered that the Athenians tried to adapt a concept typical of pre-solonian 
Athens to a more advanced legal context. On the contrary, YOUNI 2001 and 2018 has argued 
that outlawry does not represent the original form of atimia, but a different form of 
punishment that originated from Drakon’s law. So, outlawry and atimia should be regarded as 
two distinct penalties. A similar conclusion has been reached by JOYCE 2018. However, see 
the perplexities expressed by MAFFI 2018. 
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bring a suit for defending oneself from an abuse suffered could prompt the 
disfranchised individual to choose exile rather than continue living a life of 
humiliation at home. 
My second point concerns the existence, as a penalty, of a voluntary flight different in 
nature from exile, which the Athenians considered as lawful, if this right was 
exercised within the constraints imposed by law. Defendants could choose such a 
voluntary flight in a trial for homicide. The main text to refer to is Drakon’s law on 
homicide, whose original form dates back to the seventh century, but whose content is 
known thanks to an epigraphic document republished under the Athenian archon 
Diocles (409/8). Drakon’s law presents several novel aspects. In this regard Biscardi 
has argued that, while in the Homeric epic the community exercised a form of control 
over the use of force that the injured party could exert on the murderer, Drakon’s law, 
in taking away the prerogative of revenge from the family group, entrusted the city 
with the exclusive power to impose sanctions. This new way of thinking implied that 
homicide was no longer a crime, which it was up to the victim’s kin to avenge, but 
rather an act expressly forbidden by the law of the polis105. For this reason only the 
polis had the power to judge the defendant and to impose the appropriate penalty. On 
a closer look, exile was a sanction in clear continuity with previous practice, in the 
sense that it was intended to give a formal aspect to the defender’s choice to flee the 
country in order to avoid revenge by the victim’s family. Through the promulgation of 
Drakon’s law the legislator imposed that such recourse was considered a formal 
sanction imposed by the polis. Of course it was a novelty, as shown by the fact that 
the legislator felt the need to clarify it in the text of the law106:  
 
‘If someone kills the slayer or is responsible for his being killed while he 
is avoiding the agora by the horoi, games, and Amphiktyonic rites, he 
shall be treated on the same basis as one who kills an Athenian. The 
Ephetai shall bring in the verdict’107. 
 
 
105  BISCARDI 1982, 275-278, 286-287. 
106  On the novelty of exile as a punishment for involuntary homicide see CANTARELLA 1976, 87. 
107  IG I3 104, ll. 26-29 (translated by R. Stroud). The meaning of the expression agoras ephorias 
is disputed. For the traditional view see GAGARIN 1981, 58-61; for a challenge to this view see 
CANEVARO 2017, according to which agorâs ephoriâs is the archaia agora marked by horoi. 
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By this clarification the legislator attempted to eliminate a widespread practice 
allowing the victim’s family to ‘hunt down’ the wanted slayer108. In this way, for 
slayers the status of fugitive was replaced with that of an exile who continued to enjoy 
legal protection, if he is maintained far away from specific areas closely related to the 
political and religious life of the community109. But, beyond this form of legal exile, 
the law allowed the defendant in a homicide case to avoid trial by leaving the country 
before the prosecution and the defence delivered their second speeches. Some 
passages in the orators seem to demonstrate it110. In dealing with a homicide case in 
which the prosecutor charged the defendant with intentional homicide, while the 
defendant claimed to have acted in self-defence, the speaker, who pronounced the 
second speech for the defence in Antiphon’s Third Tetralogy 111 , stated that the 
accused had withdrawn from the trial (ὑπαπέστη), not because he was guilty, but 
because he was frightened of the accusers112. Although the continuation of the trial 
after the departure of the defendant appears very unlikely, this passage is evidence for 
the opportunity available to the defendants in homicide trials to leave the country after 
making the first of their two defence speeches when they feared being convicted113. 
That such behaviour appeared lawful in the eyes of judges can be deduced from 
a passage in the discourse On the Murder of Herodes114, which dates to 420-417115. 
The accused, charged with homicide, complains about the unlawfulness of the 
procedure used against him by the prosecutor: despite being accused of murder, they 
had resorted to summary arrest (ἀπαγωγή), a procedure that they should not have 
used, because it was reserved for a particular category of criminals, the so-called 
wrongdoers (κακοῦργοι) 116 , on the pretext that it was necessary to prevent the 
 
108  On this point see CANTARELLA 1976, 86-87; STOLFI 2006, 105; PEPE 2012, 21-22. 
109  CANEVARO 2017, 57-58. 
110  Antiph. 4 δ1; 5.13; Dem. 23.69; Poll. 8.117. 
111  We might interpret this passage as an indication that the defendant was supported by 
synēgoroi, as a joint defence was possible in private lawsuits, cfr. RUBINSTEIN 2000, 80-87. 
However, it is hard to reconcile joint defence with the fact that the defendant withdrew from 
the trial.  
112  Antiph. 4 δ1. Cfr. GAGARIN 1997, 170: “The speaker explains briefly that the defendant has 
voluntary left (for exile), as was allowed (Ant. 5.13; Dem. 23.69), leaving friends or relatives 
speak for him”. 
113  It is not clear why the defendant was able to abandon the trial after making only his first 
defence speech. One explanation is that the defendant had to abandon his trial before making 
his second speech because the court voted immediately afterwards. Cfr. GAGARIN 1997, 183. 
114  On this speech see HEITSCH 1984, 33-89; GAGARIN 1989 and 1997; USHER 1999, 34-40. 
115  GAGARIN 1997, 173-174. 
116  The procedure employed was an apagogē kakourgōn (cfr. MACDOWELL 1963, 136-137; 
GAGARIN 1997, VOLONAKI 2000, 152 and passim). According to some scholars it represented 
a novelty in prosecuting homicide (GAGARIN 1997, 179-180; ID. 2011, 318). In particular, 
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defendant from leaving the country 117 . The speaker contrasted this argument by 
saying that: 
 
‘You say that if I had been set free, I would not have awaited trial but 
would have departed, as if you had compelled me to come to this land 
unwillingly; but if being banned from this city was of no concern to me, I 
could equally well have not come when summoned and lost the case by 
default, or I could have made my defence but left after my first speech. 
This course is available to everyone, but you have enacted your own 
private law, trying to deprive me alone of something all other Greeks 
have’118. 
 
This passage allows us to argue that the legislator gave a legal form to a 
defendant’s habit of withdrawing from his trial and leaving the country, probably 
when the inevitability of conviction became apparent. In principle this right was 
certainly allowed to defendants in all the homicide trials, even in those for intentional 
homicide 119 . Indeed, a passage from Athenaion Politeia attests that the sellers 
(pōletai) “sold the properties of those who are in exile from the Areopagus”, namely 
of those charged with voluntary homicide who did not await the verdict of the 
Areopagus going into voluntary exile120. There were some limitations to this right. 
Pollux says that self-exile was not allowed for a charge of parricide, but it is not clear 
what his source is for this statement121.  
Antiphon expressly said that the faculty of not standing trial was a custom 
common to all Greeks, but he limited its application to homicide cases only. This can 
 
VOLONAKI 2000, 153, 157-158 has suggested that it was introduced in the last third of the fifth 
century, shortly before the start of the trial. For the idea that androphonoi could be considered 
as kakourgoi see HANSEN 1976, 47, but against this view see GAGARIN 2011, 317 n. 52. 
117  It has been suggested (PHILLIPS 2008, 125) that recourse of apagogē here was intended to 
prevent the defendant from fleeing Athens. 
118  Antiph. 5.13 (translated by M. Gagarin). 
119  Evidence of this can be found in Antiph. 4, since the defendant who did not stand trial was 
charged with voluntary homicide, and in a passage from Pollux (8.117), where he mentions 
this right in connection with dikai phonou judged by the Areopagus. Cfr. MACDOWELL 1963, 
117; GAGARIN 1981, 111-115 and ID. 1989, 27 n. 31; VOLONAKI 2000, 154; PHILLIPS 2016, 
352. 
120  Arist. Ath. Pol. 47.2 with MACDOWELL 1963, 116; RHODES 1993, 554; HARRIS 2012, 292. 
Cfr. Lys. 1.50; Dem. 23.69; Poll. 8.99. Confiscation of property for those convicted of 
voluntary homicide is also attested by Dem. 21.43. 
121  Poll. 8.117. But TODD 2016, 335-336 n. 58, is rather sceptical of the reliability of the 
lexicographer.  
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be deduced by the fact that immediately after explaining his point the speaker praises 
the laws on homicide, which are defined as the most beautiful and the most sacred of 
all laws by virtue of their antiquity and immutability 122 . However, it cannot be 
excluded that the same rule also applied to cases other than homicide, at least in 
principle. The other option available to the accused, i.e. not to appear at trial when 
summoned and to lose the case in absentia, is more difficult to assess123. While the 
possibility of abandoning a trial after the first speeches of the parties is widely 
attested, the indication that the defendant could wholly escape a trial is referred to 
only in the speech On the Murder of Herodes, where the accused is a foreigner. Thus 
it could be suggested that the defendant might here be referring to his theoretical 
option of remaining in his home and ignoring the summons rather than to an option 
allowed him by law. This is not to say that in the case of a dike phonou the 
contumacia was unlawful and thus sanctioned, but rather that the scanty evidence we 
have does not allow us to say anything for sure about this issue. 
 Instead, it is unlikely that the right to wholly avoid trial or to abandon it after 
the first speeches was also valid in cases of impeachment. In eisangeliai a guarantee 
was always required that the defendant would appear in court. The probouleuma 
issued by the Council specified whether the defendant should provide for sureties or 
should be arrested, but for serious charges, such as treason or an attempt to overthrow 
the democracy, provision of sureties was not allowed and the accused was held in 
custody124. Preventive detention for those who were awaiting trial is well attested and 
indicates the will to prevent the accused from escaping 125 . These differences in 
prosecuting homicide and crimes chargeable under eisangelia are understandable 
when we think of the distinction between private and public actions, that is between 
dikai on one side and graphai on the other side (which include eisangeliai as 
procedures deeming it a serious threat to public order). Although it is difficult to make 
a clear distinction in ancient Greek law between the public and private sphere, given 
the difficulty of keeping the rules of social life apart from political governance, 
prosecution for homicide is an emblematic instance of such distinction, since, 
 
122  Antiph. 5.14.  
123  Antiph. 5.13: ἴσον ἦν μοι καὶ προσκληθέντι μὴ ἐλθεῖν. 
124  Dem. 24.144-145. The Eleven had to bring the defendant to trial within 30 days from his arrest 
(Dem. 24.63). 
125  See supra p. 116 n. 6. 
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contrary to what we would expect, it was entrusted not to the state, but to the victim’s 
relatives.   
These reflections lead to the conclusion that the legislator took into 
consideration as much the faculty of abandoning a trial during its course as the issue 
of contumacia not only for homicide trials, but even more so for serious crimes whose 
impact on the public sphere was evident. What I intend to show is that in the latter 
case none of these options were permitted. 
 
4. 
We have said that defendants in eisangelia trials often went into exile in order 
to avoid the death penalty. Yet such behaviour, despite the frequency with which it 
occurred, was considered as unlawful. Some clues can support this statement.  
A fragment of Aristotle’s Constitution of Pellene attests to the existence of 
μαστῆρες126. These were a sort of professional ‘impounders’, officers charged to 
search for the property of those exiled for life (ζητηταὶ τῶν φυγαδευτικῶν χρημάτων). 
It can be suggested that the purpose of seeking the property of exiles was to confiscate 
it. Of course from Aristotle it is possible only to speak of them at Pellene, but we 
know, from Hypereides’ lost speech Against Pancalus, of which only one fragment 
survives, about officers with the same name operating in Athens127. A more striking 
parallel can be found in a passage of the fourth epistle of Themistocles and addressed 
to Abronicus, in which the former complains about the fury of his fellow citizens, 
who added a death sentence to exile resulting from ostracism. Furthermore, 
Themistocles reports the presence of Athenian investigators (μαστῆρες Ἀθηναίων) 
sent to Argos to find him128. This data allows us to affirm that the μαστῆρες did not 
limit themselves to hunting down ‘undeclared’ goods in their homeland, but extended 
their impounding efforts beyond the exile’s native country129. 
 An important issue to take into consideration is the placing of defendants who 
did not face trial being considered like outlaws. This is a point on which I disagree 
with Hansen. While he postulates that exile in the sources means that a death penalty 
in absentia was commuted into exile, I suggest that such commutation makes no sense 
 
126  Arist. 8.44 fr. 567 (Rose) = Phot., Lex. Seg. s.v. μαστῆρες. 
127  Hyp. fr. 133 Jensen. The name Pancalus is quite rare. For the identification of this Pancalus 
with the one mentioned in the speech Against Athenogenes, see WHITEHEAD 2000, 293. 
128  Them. Epist. 4.16. 
129  Cfr. Dem. 23.44-45. 
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in Attic law; on the contrary, I argue that the main penalty continued being death, 
which was never cancelled. Moreover, the relevant judicial authority, which in this 
instance had a good chance of being the Assembly130, could add to it outlawry and 
other supplementary penalties such as hereditary atimia and razing of the house. In 
this regard I shall examine some aspects of the eisangeliai against the Hermocopids 
and Thessalus’ eisangelia against Alcibiades 131 . In the first instance different 
prosecutors, among whom we know that Pythonicus, Speusippus and Thessalus were 
included, impeached many Athenian citizens and at least a metic after denunciations 
both to the Assembly and to the Council 132 . The defendants were charged with 
profaning mysteries as well as mutilating the Hermai. Of the individuals accused, 
most left the country before trial. Only Polystratus and Leogoras remained to stand 
trial. The former was arrested and remained in custody till his trial day; then he was 
condemned to death and executed.  
 The latter brought a graphē paranomōn against his prosecutor Speusippus on 
the basis of the unlawfulness of his proposal133. All the other defendants fled Athens 
and were condemned to death and confiscation of property by default134. Moreover, 
Thucydides states that ‘bringing the accused to trial executed as many as were 
apprehended, and condemned to death such as had fled and set a price upon their 
heads135. My point is that if voluntary exile had been lawful, it would not have been 
possible to place a price on the defendants’ heads. The same can be said about 
confiscation of property, which was added to the Hermocopids, who escaped trial 
after their flight 136 . If their departure from Athens was legal or somehow was 
connected to a lawful form of exile, this measure would not have been applied. In 
 
130  I follow the view of YOUNI 2018, 152: ‘A decree of outlawry could also be issued after a 
normal trial had taken place which had resulted in a death sentence in those cases when the 
convict had escaped, as in the case of Alcibiades and the other persons convicted in the 
numerous eisangeliai of 415’.  
131  These and other trials dating back to the years of the Peloponnesian War have been examined 
recently by YOUNI 2018, 143-146 with regard to outlawry. 
132  Cfr. HANSEN 1975, 77-82, who has recorded the names of more than fifty citizens in two 
different waves of indictments. 
133  And. 1.17, 22. 
134  Thuc. 6.61.7. 
135  Thuc. 6.60.4: τοὺς δὲ καταιτιαθέντας κρίσεις ποιήσαντες τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, ὅσοι 
ξυνελήφθησαν, τῶν δὲ διαφυγόντων θάνατον καταγνόντες ἐπανεῖπον ἀργύριον τῷ 
ἀποκτείναντι. 
136  And. 1.13, 47; IG I3 421-430; SEG 13.17, 89, 94. For the authenticity of Andocides’ lists on 
the names of individuals involved in the affair of the Hermai and in the parody of Mysteries 
see HARRIS 2013b, 159-160. 
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fact, both ostracism and lawful exile were not accompanied by confiscation of 
property. 
 The same holds true for Thessalus’ eisangelia against Alcibiades137. A passage 
from Plutarch’s Life of Alcibiades preserves the indictment (ἔγκλημα)138  with the 
charge of impiety (asebeia) towards the two goddesses for having parodied the 
mysteries of Eleusis 139 . Although some sources emphasize Alcibiades’ status of 
phygas140, the sequence in which the facts are narrated shows that the death penalty 
was a consequence of his failure to appear at his trial. An important point is what 
Diodorus says about the procedural iter followed in the case of undefended actions 
(ἐρήμαι δίκαι):  
 
‘The Athenians, after having transferred to the court the names of 
Alcibiades and the other fugitives, condemned them to death by default141.  
 
If Diodorus is right, once it was clear that Alcibiades and his comrades would 
not returned to Athens, the Athenians brought the names of the fugitives to the law-
court for a trial by default. We do not know if in this kind of trial the judges were 
expected to hear the prosecution’s speech before voting or if they limited themselves 
to voting after hearing the charge against the defendant included in the indictment142. 
The law-court established the death penalty and confiscation of property143. Besides 
this, it is possible to say that additional penalties were added by the Assembly, which 
 
137  On the reasons for considering the procedure used against Alcibiades an eisangelia originated 
from Diopithes’ decree (Plut. Per. 32.1) see LODDO 2019a, 19-24. Contra FILONIK 2013, 41, 
who believes it was a graphē asebeias. 
138  In the eisangelia procedure the plaint could be called both enklēma and eisangelia. Cfr. 
HARRIS 2013b, 143 n. 3. 
139  Plut. Alc. 19.2-3; 22.4-5. Scholars have generally considered this indictment as authentic 
(FROST 1961; STADTER 1989, LXIX-LXXI; PELLING 2000, 27) with rare exceptions (HARRIS 
2013b, 148 n. 21; FILONIK 2013, 41 n. 107) and derived from a documentary source, probably 
Craterus’ collection of decrees (FARAGUNA 2006, 199-205; 2016; 2017, 27-28, but for a more 
cautious approach see ERDAS 2002, 18-23, 29 ss., 303-304). Craterus’ work included both 
indictments and trial judgments (dikai), as shown by Phrynicus and Antiphon’s trials 
(FARAGUNA 2017, 28). Finally, we know that eisangelia indictments were stored in the 
archives of the Council and the Assembly. On this point see SICKINGER 1999, 131-133 and 
240 n. 100; HARRIS 2013b, 154-160, also for all types of judicial documents kept on file. It 
was in this way that Craterus consulted such material (FARAGUNA 2017, 28).  
140  Thuc. 7.61.7; Isoc. 16.45; Dem. 21.146. On Demosthenes’ alterations of the case for 
resembling that of Midias see HARRIS 2013b, 153-154 n. 38. 
141  Diod. 13.5.4: οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι παραδόντες δικαστηρίῳ τοῦ τε Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
τῶν συμφυγόντων τὰ ὀνόματα δίκην ἐρήμην κατεδίκασαν θανάτου. 
142  The anonymous reviewer suggests to me that the second hypothesis is more likely. 
143  Death penalty: Thuc. 6.61.7; Diod. 13.5.4; Nep. Alc. 4.5. Confiscation of property: Plut. Alc. 
22.5; IG I3 421-430. 
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‘decreed that his name should be publicly cursed by all priests and priestesses’144. 
Likewise the Assembly issued a decree that Alcibiades was to be considered an 
outlaw and that accordingly his name was inscribed on the bronze stele145. 
Alcibiades’ irregular status is also proven by the extradition request the 
Athenians made to the Argives146. According to his son, the speaker of Isocrates’ 
speech On the team of horses, Alcibiades sought refuge at Argos, but was forced to 
leave when some Athenian ambassadors had gone to Argos to ask for his 
extradition147. The Athenians, therefore, did not tolerate Alcibiades’ voluntary exile. 
This is shown by his behaviour once he returned to Athens. For fear of his enemies, 
he did not disembark immediately, but he looked around to see if any of his friends 
were present. And only when he saw some relatives and friends did he disembark, 
taking care to avoid being touched 148 . This is why, despite the safe-conduct he 
received, he was aware that until the sentence against him was formally annulled 
anyone could have arrested him and taken him to the Eleven, as he was also 
considered an outlaw149. 
As we see for the Hermocopids, there was in Athens the practice of setting 
bounties on those who escaped trial. This could be a way to increase the likelihood of 
enforcing the sentence issued by the court150. Although our information about them is 
quite episodic and most evidence concerns famous personalities, some interesting 
cases can be mentioned. Both the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, for example, 
hunted down Themistocles. When he was already in exile because of ostracism for his 
collaboration with Pausanias, the Athenians issued an arrest warrant against him and 
instructed some emissaries to find him and arrest him wherever he was151. We have 
no information about the identity of those Athenians sent to seek out Themistocles, 
whether they were magistrates or ordinary citizens paid for this task. This episode 
might be correlated with what is reported in the abovementioned epistle credited to 
Themistocles: were these emissaries in some way related to the Athenian seekers who 
 
144  Plut. Alc. 22.5. Diod. 13.69.2; Nep. Alc. 4.5. 
145  Inscription of his name on a stele: Isoc. 16.9; Diod. 13.69.2; Nep. Alc. 4.5. 
146  For extradition of exiles and refugees see LONIS 1988. 
147  Isoc. 16.9. For discussion on plausibility of this version see LODDO 2019a, 26-27 n. 70. 
148  Xen. Hell. 1.4.18-19; Diod. 13.69.1. 
149  For an attempt to reconstruct the procedure which those sentenced to death and outlawry in 
absentia had to follow in order to return home, see ultra pp. 147-149. 
150  HARRISON 1971, 185-186. 
151  Thuc. 1.135.3. 
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went to Argos to arrest him?152. It is also known that even the Persians promised a 
reward for Themistocles’ capture. In this regard Plutarch says that, having sought 
refuge in Cuma, he noticed on arrival at the port that there were several men on the 
beach ready to capture him. Among them he distinctly recognized Ergoteles and 
Pythodorus153. It was the enormous reward of two hundred talents promised by the 
Persian King to whoever captured him, dead or alive, that attracted these men. They 
probably were Athenians, since Themistocles could recognize them at once, but it is 
impossible to say whether they acted in an official capacity, whether they were 
professional exile hunters or whether they were ordinary citizens, attracted by the rich 
reward154.  
A similar fate struck the poet Diagoras of Melos. Although Hansen has not 
included this trial in his catalogue, it is likely that it was an eisangelia 155 . By 
Diopithes’ decree, probably dating back to the years 440-430, it was proposed to 
indict ‘those who did not believe in the gods or who taught on celestial 
phenomena’156. By this decree the scope of the eisangelia may have been extended to 
crimes related to the religious sphere. Diagoras was judged in absentia, as a result of 
his having fled Athens for Pellene in Achaia, likely frightened by the hostile 
sentiments of the people. He can be considered indeed a fugitive who left Attica to 
escape trial. The Athenians did not limit themselves to sentencing him to death, but 
when they learned that Diagoras was in Pellene they asked for his extradition157. 
Faced with Pellenes’s refusal, they announced a reward of one talent for whoever 
killed Diagoras, and two talents for whoever brought him back alive to Athens. The 
episode must have had a certain resonance, as shown by the fact that Aristophanes, in 
his comedy The Birds, also mentions him158. Another important reference to this case 
can be found in the speech Against Andocides: 
 
 
152  Them. Epist. 4.16. 
153  Plut. Them. 26.1. 
154  We know about individuals who hunted after exiles by profession. The best known was 
Archias of Thurii, the so-called ‘hunter of exiles’ (φυγαδοθήρας). Cfr. Plut. Dem. 28.3; [Plut.] 
X orat. 846f. 
155  MACDOWELL 1978, 201; ERDAS 2002, 202-204; WINIARCZYK 2016, 56 n. 73.  
156  Plut. Per. 32.2. On Diopithes’ decree see LODDO 2019a, 23-24. 
157  Craterus FGrH 342 fr. 16a = schol. Ar. ran. 320; fr. 16b + Melantius FGrH 326 fr. 3 = schol. 
Ar. Av. 1073. 
158  Ar. Av. 1073. Cfr. ERDAS 2002, 197-207. 
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‘You should not set free those criminals you have at hand, while seeking 
to capture those who are in exile, proclaiming by herald that you will give 
a talent of silver to anyone who arrests or kills them. Otherwise, it will 
seem to the Greeks that you are more keen to show off than to punish’159. 
 
The ban against Diagoras was accompanied by the inscription of his name on a 
bronze stele. This corresponds to the widespread use in Athens to engrave on a stele 
the names of the dishonoured and their confiscated property160. Pollux reports that the 
list of property confiscated from those who had committed acts of impiety against the 
goddesses was found in the stele of Eleusis (ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἀττικαῖς στήλαις, αἳ κεῖνται ἐν 
Ἐλευσῖνι)161. It is striking that the term στηλίτης, whose meaning is literally ‘written 
up on a stele’, had the specialised meaning of ‘dishonoured’162. 
Another clue that voluntary exiles of this kind were to be considered as 
fugitives, and that their behaviour was considered unlawful, is the existence of a law 
prohibiting citizens from helping exiles by giving them passage on Athenian ships. 
This ban, which is implicit in Thucydides narrative about Themistocles’ escape to 
Ionia, emerges more clearly from a long passage of the speech Against Policles. The 
speaker says that Callistratus of Aphidna, who was in exile to avoid standing trial, 
tried to join the general Timomachus, to whom he was related. He gave a messenger 
letters for Timomachus, asking him to send a trireme in order to reach him. Later the 
speaker was approached by Callicles of Tria, who revealed to him that without his 
knowledge he was about to transport in his ship an exile, whom the Athenians had 
twice condemned to death. However, the law forbade doing it. The speaker, being 
aware of the risks he was about to face, told Callippus that he had no intention of 
 
159  [Lys.] 6.18. Cfr. BAUMAN 1990, 67, TODD 2007, 453. See also YOUNI 2018, 145. 
160  And. 1.51; Lyc. 1.117; Plut. [Mor.] 834b. It is noteworthy that the polis’ decision to eliminate 
all physical traces of the convicted traitor - for the ways in which this happened see supra pp. 
125-127 - went hand in hand with the practice of publicizing his infamy by inscribing his 
name on a bronze stele. Cfr. HELMIS 2007, 267-268; QUEYREL BOTTINEAU 2010, 277-278. 
161  Poll. 10.97. 
162  Some examples: Isoc. 16.9, who uses it with regard to Alcibiades; Dem. 9.45 on Arthmius of 
Zelea; Arist. Rhet. 2.24.1400a 33-34, on Thrasybulus of Collytus’ allegation against 
Leodamas. The latter would have been a στηλίτης, but he would have ordered his name on the 
stele of traitors (here paraphrased as ‘his hostility towards the demos’) to be taken down under 
the Thirty. Cfr. Lys. 26.13, 21-24.  
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transporting Callistratus, as the laws did not permit taking on an exile and punished 
the transgressor with the same penalties as those in flight163. 
But the most important evidence of a different treatment of those exiled in 
consequence to a court sentence, as opposed to those who escaped trial by fleeing into 
exile, can be found in an extract from the homicide law in the speech Against 
Aristocrates. I report the law on the persecution and seizure of a murderer included in 
the speech and Demosthenes’ subsequent paraphrase of it: 
 
(44) Read the next law.  
[Law] If anyone pursues or seizes and carries away beyond the border 
any of the murderers in exile whose goods are not confiscated, he is to 
owe the same penalty as one who did this in our own territory164.  
Here is another law, men of Athens, which is humane and good. This man 
has obviously violated this law in a similar way.  (45) “If anyone [pursues 
or seizes] a murderer in exile,” it states, “whose goods are not 
confiscated.” He means those who have left the country on a charge of 
involuntary homicide. What makes this clear? His use of the phrase “who 
has gone abroad” and not “who has gone into exile” and the qualification 
“whose goods are not confiscated” because the property of those who 
commit deliberate homicide is confiscated165. 
 
This law forbade pursuing, seizing, and carrying away murderers in exile across 
boundary lines; it established for the transgressor the same penalties as if these acts 
had been committed in Attica, that is as if they had been committed against a citizen 
epitimos who lived in Attica166. It must be said that the meaning of the law is debated. 
Some scholars have held that it referred to the arrest and the forced repatriation of 
convicted murderers167; others have argued that the law focussed on the property of 
exiled murderers 168 , while others have claimed that it protected the exiles from 
 
163  Dem. 50.46-49. The existence of such a law is implicitly confirmed by Themistocles’ fear 
when he embarked on an Athenian ship during his flight to Ionia (Thuc. 1.137.2). 
164  This document also is part of the stichometric edition. See CANEVARO 2013, 58-61. 
165  Dem. 23.44-45. 
166  Dem. 23.46: ἐὰν δέ τις παρὰ ταῦτα ποιῇ, τὴν αὐτὴν ἔδωκεν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ δίκην, ἥνπερ ἂν εἰ 
μένοντ᾽ ἠδίκει [οἴκοι], γράψας ταὔτ᾽ ὀφείλειν, ἅπερ ἂν οἴκοι δράσῃ. 
167  MACDOWELL 1963, 121-122; PHILLIPS 2008, 64, 79. 
168  GAGARIN 1981, 60 n. 83; CANEVARO 2013, 61. 
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enslavement169 . These different views are motivated by the distance we can see 
between the text of the law in Dem. 23.44 (and Demosthenes’ comments at § 45), 
where the expression is ἐλαύνῃ ἢ φέρῃ ἢ ἄγῃ, and what Demosthenes said at § 46, 
where the expression is simply ἐλαύνειν καὶ ἄγειν. It is important to stress that the 
legislator was concerned with specifying to which category of murderers this rule 
applied, as is evident from use of the relative clause ὧν τὰ χρήματα ἐπίτιμα. However, 
the difficulty of interpretation does not seem insurmountable, given the convergence 
between the text of the law and Dem. 23.45. Thus, I believe that the law focussed on 
the exiled murderer and not his property, which is mentioned only in the relative 
clause, and that those exiled for unintentional homicide were protected from the risk 
of enslavement170. It is true, however, that, in addition to revenge on the part of the 
victim’s family, one of the reasons why the exile could be pursued was the desire to 
take possession of his property, as Demosthenes implied. 
This provision applied only to those convicted of unintentional murder. While 
the text of the law is not so explicit in referring to them, Demosthenes is clear about 
this. He says that the expression ἐάν τίς τινα τῶν ἀνδροφόνων τῶν ἐξεληλυθότων, ὧν 
τὰ χρήματα ἐπίτιμα indicates those who left the country following a conviction for 
unintentional homicide171. It is remarkable that Demosthenes draws attention to some 
expressions that are important for understanding the implications of the law. “Tῶν 
ἐξεληλυθότων» designates those who went into exile after a formal conviction172, 
since it contrasts with “φευγόντων”, which means “ those who fled into exile” without 
a court sentence. It is evident here that while ἐξέρχομαι indicates those sentenced to 
exile, φεύγω means “to flee”, “to abandon the country of origin”173.  
 
169  HARRIS 2018, 43-44 n. 72. 
170  On this point I agree with HARRIS 2018, 43-44 n. 72. 
171  We should also consider what Demosthenes says in § 40, i.e. the legislator forbade the 
murderer from any place where the victim was wont to frequent in his lifetime.  
172  From the use of the term ἀνδροφόνος we can infer that the law in Dem. 23.37 and 
Demosthenes’ paraphrase of this law at §§ 38-43 only referred to a convicted murder. Cfr. 
GAGARIN 1981, 59. This is confirmed by what Demosthenes says at § 38: ἐκεῖνος ᾤετο τὸν 
πεφευγότ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αἰτίᾳ φόνου καὶ ἑαλωκότα, ἐάνπερ ἅπαξ ἐκφύγῃ καὶ σωθῇ, εἴργειν μὲν τῆς τοῦ 
παθόντος πατρίδος δίκαιον εἶναι, κτείνειν δ᾽ οὐχ ὅσιον πανταχοῦ, where ἑαλωκότα means 
“convicted”. 
173  This is not to say that Demosthenes always distinguished in this speech between ἐξέρχομαι 
and φεύγω in this way, but that he did it when he commented the wording of the law. On the 
ambiguity of the meaning of φεύγω/φυγή see GRASMÜCK 1978, 20-29; SEIBERT 1979, 2-3; 
YOUNI 2001, 130; FORSDYKE 2005, 9-11; GAERTNER 2007, 2-3; PEPE 2012, 22-24. 
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This piece of information is consistent with what we know about the penalty 
imposed on intentional murderers174. But what is interesting here is the opposition 
between exiles for unintentional murder, who were legitimately in exile following a 
court verdict, and intentional murderers, who escaped the death sentence by going 
into exile. As we have seen, the law allowed anyone accused of homicide to go into 
exile after making the first of his two speeches. For this reason recourse to exile by 
someone accused of intentional homicide was lawful and no one could prevent him 
from choosing this option. Nevertheless, what we can infer from this law is that exile 
as a practical alternative to the death sentence for intentional murder was not 
comparable to the penalty of exile for those convicted of unintentional murder. While 
it is debated whether even those accused of intentional homicide who abandoned trial 
continued to be protected in exile, like unintentional murderers, some features seem to 
attest a clear distinction between the two legal situations.  
First, the property of the intentional murderer who went into exile voluntarily 
was confiscated175; second, the law preserved in Dem. 23.44 attests that the Athenian 
law protected any murderers in exile, beyond its borders, from the risk of 
enslavement, while this protection was not accorded to those who had fled into exile 
voluntarily; lastly, pardon (aidesis) could be theoretically granted both to intentional 
and unintentional murderers who underwent the trial176, but it was less likely that 
those who escaped the death penalty by going into exile would obtain it. This is 
evident from the fact that their property was confiscated at home and, if we are right 
in our interpretation of the law in Dem. 23.44, was exempt from any protection 
abroad177. Besides, it is reasonable to believe that the confiscation of property would 
have made it more difficult for intentional murderers to negotiate a pardon with the 
victim’s family178. 
 
174  Lys. 1.50; Dem. 21.43; Arist. Ath. Pol. 47.2; Poll. 8.99. 
175  The penalties imposed on those found guilty for intentional murder were death and 
confiscation of property; if the defendant did not stand trial he was sentenced to permanent 
exile (ἀειφυγία) and confiscation of property. Cfr. MACDOWELL 1963, 115-117 and ultra n. 
178. However, see GAGARIN 1981, 112-115 for the view that exile was a penalty for 
intentional homicide. 
176  PEPE 2012, 71 n. 142 with further references. 
177  It is tempting to connect this provision with the practice of sending officials abroad to search 
for the property of those exiled for life (ζητηταὶ τῶν φυγαδευτικῶν χρημάτων), for which see 
supra p. 138 n. 126. 
178  For this consideration see PEPE 2012, 76-77. Moreover, most scholars have considered 
aeiphygia a definitive condition (MACDOWELL 1963, 113; WALLACE 1989, 125, 258 n. 119), 
which was “irreversibile” (PEPE 2012, 77), a “punishment virtually equivalent to death” 
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We can draw some conclusions. In Athens being prosecuted by the eisangelia 
procedure must have inspired fear in a defendant, regardless of whether he was 
innocent or guilty. While the risk for a prosecutor was minimal, a defendant was 
likely to be condemned to death and executed. For these reasons prosecutors were in 
the habit of resorting to eisangelia even in those cases in which Attic law provided for 
alternative procedures, such as public actions. Considerations about the frequency 
with which prosecutors used eisangelia, with the high risk to ending in a conviction, 
must have advised defendants against standing trial and, instead, choosing to go into a 
voluntary exile. Scholars have considered this particular form of exile as lawful or a 
tolerated practice. But the frequency of an action says nothing about its legitimacy. 
There may well have been some tolerance shown towards an increasingly widespread 
practice, especially if defendants were not so prominent or in cases that had not 
caused any particular uproar. Nevertheless, the evidence I have presented in this paper 
shows that such behaviour was never considered lawful or in conformity with the law.  
This paper has shown that recourse to self-exile in order to escape the death 
penalty was common to defendants in trials for voluntary homicide and in eisangelia 
trials. But while those accused of homicide could abandon trial and go into exile after 
giving their first defence speeches, this option was not available for defendants in 
eisangeliai. In the first instance, if a defendant left the trial, it was tantamount to 
admitting his guilt; it is reasonable to assume that the court voted immediately after 
hearing the second prosecution speech and merely acknowledged the guilt of the 
defendant. As concerns eisangelia trials, ancient evidence enables us to see only what 
happened to defendants who did not stand trial. In the case of the ἔρημος δίκη, when a 
defendant in a capital case failed to appear at trial, the court always opted for the 
sternest penalty in the statutes, namely capital punishment. It was up to the Assembly 
to decree additional penalties, such as confiscation of property and outlawry, since 
they were ep’andri measures. All these penalties were tantamount to making the 
defendant who had evaded Athenian justice an outlaw. The inscription of the names 
of those condemned by default on the stele of the infamous, which was placed on the 
Acropolis, seems, in this sense, the clearest proof of the illegality of this conduct. 
One wonders at this point if and in what way an individual sentenced in 
absentia could return to Athens. Was a formal annulment of the sentence required? Or 
 
(HARRIS 2018, 41 n. 66; cfr. FORSDYKE 2005, 11: “is not surprising that the penalty for 
intentional homicide is variously designated as death, ἀτιμία, ἀειφυγία, exile for life”). 
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was the original trial reopened, as in the case of the anadikos dikē179? Despite our 
scanty evidence, it seems reasonable to exclude the latter hypothesis. In order to 
return to Athens, those sentenced to capital punishment in absentia had to obtain 
above all a safe-conduct; otherwise, being outlaws, they could suffer summary arrest 
or be killed with impunity. What happened to Callistratus of Aphidna is indicative. He 
returned to Athens from exile without a safe-conduct, maybe on the basis of some 
reassurances received from those who supported his return, but was executed. 
Alcibiades’ caution is equally suggestive 180 . When he arrived at Piraeus, after a 
formal recall, he did not disembark before making sure that his friends and relatives 
were among the crowd that had gathered at the harbour to welcome him181. Once he 
disembarked, he was escorted by his epitēdeioi to the Assembly. They made sure that 
no one touched him, in the fear that someone would resort to summary arrest against 
him. At the Assembly he delivered his defence speech, in which he said that he had 
committed no act of impiety and that he had been the victim of injustice. Others spoke 
after him in the same terms. At that point the Assembly approved a decree advanced 
by Critias on Alcibiades’ return182. The decree provided for the granting of a golden 
crown, the appointment of Alcibiades as a stratēgos autokratōr, the return of the 
confiscated goods, and the withdrawal of the curse against him by Eumolpides and 
Cerices. Nepos and Diodorus add that the stelae on which the sentence and the other 
measures against Alcibiades had been inscribed were destroyed and thrown into the 
sea183. Notwithstanding all the limitations inherent in the generalization of a particular 
case for reconstructing the procedure, it must be admitted that this represents the most 
likely scenario for those trying to return to Athens. Only a formal decree of the 




179  Although the rule of the ne bis de eadem re (Dem. 24.54) was strictly observed in Athens, in 
some particular circumstances it was possible to reopen the case (schol. Plat. Leg. 937d: ἐπὶ 
μόνης ξενίας καὶ ψευδομαρτυριῶν καὶ κλήρων), especially when it was connected with the 
conferment of false evidence, cfr. HARRISON 1971, 191-192 and more extensively BEHREND 
1975. 
180  Ancient accounts stress Alcibiades’ fear once he arrived in Athens: φοβούμενος τοὺς ἐχθρούς 
(Xen. Hell. 1.4.18); ἀλλ ἐκεῖνος καὶ δεδιὼς κατήγετο (Plut. Alc. 32.2). 
181  We know of Alcibiades’ return from the accounts of Xen. Hell 1.4.12-19; Diod. 13.68.3-69.2; 
Nep. Alc. 6; Plut. Alc. 32-33. 
182  Plut. Alc. 33.1. It was the second attempt to recall Alcibiades after the one that occurred in 
411, when the Athenians decreed that he and his comrades in exile could return to Athens 
(Thuc. 8.97.3); according to Diod. 13.42.2 Theramenes was the proposer. 
183  Diod. 13.69.2; Nep. Alc. 6.5. 
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